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The Holder of U.C.C. Section 3-407(2)(a) and the
Windfall Discharge
Charles C. Lewis*
I.

Introduction

Section 3-407 of the Uniform Commercial Code, entitled "Alteration," sets out the law relating to alteration of negotiable instruments.,
2
Subsection 1 of 3-407 defines alteration in terms of a material alteration
and lists three illustrations.3 Subsection 2 of 3-407 states the general rule
of discharge in cases of material alteration: "[A]lteration by the holder
which is both fraudulent and material discharges any party whose contract is thereby changed ....
.
The last clause of section 3-407(2)(a) asserts an express exception to
the general rule. If the party whose contract is changed assents to the
change or is precluded from asserting the defense of a fraudulent, mate4
rial alteration, then that party is not discharged on the instrument.
Section 3-407(3) and the introductory clause of section 3-407(2)5
create a second exception to the general rule. The discharge provided for
the party whose contract has been fraudulently and materially altered by
the holder may not be asserted against a subsequent holder in due
course. 6 Thus, the subsequent holder in due course under section
3-407(3) may enforce a fraudulently and materially altered instrument
according to its original tenor. If the alteration is made by competing an
incomplete instrument, 7 however, the holder in due course may enforce
the instrument as completed.

Section 3-407(2)(b) states a corollary of the general rule of section
* Professor of Law, Campbell University School of Law. B.A. (1968); J.D. (1971), Washington & Lee.
1. U.C.C. § 3-104(1) (1977) defines a negotiable instrument under Article 3; § 3-104(2) labels
the negotiable instruments controlled by Article 3 as drafts, checks, certificates of deposit, and notes.
2. U.C.C. § 3-407(1) (1977) defines material alteration as an alteration which "changes the
contract of any party thereto in any respect ...."
3. U.C.C. § 3-407(1) (1977) states that a material alteration includes changes such as the following: "(a) the number or relations of the parties; or (b) an incomplete instrument, by completing it
otherwise than as authorized; or (c) the writing as signed, by adding to it or by removing any part of
it." Id. Section 3-407 makes it plain by use of the word "including" that the above illustrations are
not an exclusive list of all possible material alterations.
4. U.C.C. § 3-407(2)(a) (1977). Comment 3(c) provides:
Assent to the alteration given before or after it is made will prevent the party from asserting the discharge. "Or is precluded from asserting the defense" is added in the paragraph
(a) to recognize the possibility of an estoppel or other ground barring the defense which
does not rest on assent.
5. "As against any person other than a subsequent holder in due course .
U.C.C.
§ 3-407(2) (1977).
6. U.C.C. § 3-302(1) (1977) defines a holder in due course as "a holder who takes the instrument (a) for value; and (b) in good faith; and (c) without notice that it is overdue or has been
dishonored or of any defense against or claim to it on the part of any person."
7. U.C.C. § 3-407(l)(b)'s definition of material alteration includes any such change in an incomplete instrument, by completing it otherwise than as authorized. See supra note 3.
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3-407(2)(a). If the alteration is not fraudulent, not material, or not made
by "the holder," the party whose contract is changed is not discharged.,
The instrument may be enforced according to its original tenor. If, however, the instrument is altered by completion, it may be enforced according to the authority given the party making the completion.
The general rule, together with its exceptions and corollary, state
the law under the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) for material alteration of a negotiable instrument. In the many articles which have appeared before and after adoption of the U.C.C. by the various states, law
review writers gave the practicing bar a similar statement of the law.9
Only one of the earlier writers, Professor Roy L. Steinheimer, Jr., raised
a possible problem of interpretation.1 0 Professor Steinheimer asked rhetorically, "What is meant by the provision that the alteration must be by
'the holder'? Does this expression refer to any holder of the instrument
or only to the holder at the time claim is made and the defense
asserted?"'I
Except for a student note suggesting some confusion as to the meaning of "the holder,"' 2 no law review article mentioned this interpretive
problem until some ten years later when Professor James J. White began
to pull on the tethers and poke at the innards of Article 3.13 Some six
years later, Professor Robert Dugan replied to Professor White's article
and challenged his interpretation of "the holder" in section 3-407.14
8. U.C.C. § 3-407 comment 3(d) (1977) provides: "If the alteration is not material or if it is
not made for a fraudulent purpose there is no discharge, and the instrument may be enforced according to its original tenor." It says nothing about discharge if a fraudulent and material alteration is
not made "by the holder," a conclusion made by the author from the language in § 407(2)(a).
9. Bell, Negotiable Instruments, Banks and Customer Relations. A General Practitioner's
Guide to the Uniform Commercial Code, Article 3 and 4, 2 CUM.-SAM. L. REV. 266, 311 (1971);
Bergari, In Re Articles 3, 4 and 5, 28 TEMP. L.Q. 529, 531 (1955); Boyce, The Uniform Commercial
Code in Utah, 9 UTAH L. REV. 904, 925 (1965); Cosway, Negotiable Instruments-A Comparison of
Washington Law and the Uniform Commercial Code, 43 WASH. L. REV. 499, 514 (1968); Cosway,
Innovations in Articles 3 and 4 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 16 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 284,
298 (1951); Helstad, The Impact of the Uniform Commercial Code on Wisconsin Law, 1964 Wis. L.
REV. 355, 369 (1964); Miller & Crea, The Uniform CommercialCode: Effect on the Law of Negotiable Instruments in New York, 30 BROOKLYN L. REV. 204, 245 (1963); Penney, A Summary ofArticles 3 and 4 and Their Impact in New York, 46 CORNELL L.Q. 47, 66 (1962); Samore, The Uniform
Commercial Code, 29 ALB. L. REV. 1, 23 (1965); Sears, Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code
and Colorado Negotiable Instruments Law, 38 U. COLO. L. REV. 22, 47 (1965); Skouby, Article 3.
CommercialPaper, 29 Mo. L. REV. 395, 403 (1964); Comment, Effect of the Adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code on the Oregon Law of Negotiable Instruments, 43 OR. L. REV. 144, 154
(1964).
10. R. STEINHEIMER, MICHIGAN NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW AND THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 92 (1960) [hereinafter cited as R. STEINHEIMER, MICHIGAN NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW]; Steinheimer, Impact of the Commercial Code on Liability of Parties to Negotiable

Instruments in Michigan, 53 MICH. L. REV. 171, 185 (1954) [hereinafter cited as Steinheimer, Impact of the Commercial Code].
11. R. STEINHEIMER, MICHIGAN NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW, supra note 10, at 90;
Steinheimer, Impact of the Commercial Code, supra note 10, at 185.
12. Note, The Effect of the Adoption of the Proposed Uniform Commercial Code on the Negotiable Instruments Law of Louisiana-MaterialAlterations, 16 LA. L. REV. 105, 111 (1955).
13. White, Some Petty Complaints about Article Three, 65 MICH. L. REV. 1315 (1967).
14. Dugan, A New Approach to "Holder"Conundrums Under Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code-A Reply to Professor White, 13 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 1 (1971).
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Since Professor Dugan's reply to Professor White, no articles have
been written about this interpretive problem and its consequences. The
reason for this lack of attention logically rests in the dearth of cases
which have approached the problem in the years since Professor Dugan
and Professor White wrote. Although no courts have confronted the
problem, regulations1 5 have been passed and legislation 16 has been proposed which have some effect on the interpretation of "the holder." Certainly, the time has come to review the problems brought about by the
confusion regarding who "the holder" is in section 3-407, to assess the
validity of the possible interpretations of "the holder," and to explore
any cases, legislation and regulations affecting the problem. In addition,
since none of the previously written articles have ever analyzed the legislative history of section 3-407 and its predecessor, the Negotiable Instruments Law, or the case law preceding the Negotiable Instruments Law,
the time for examination of these sources has also come. The author
hopes to reach a conclusion on the interpretive problem and to suggest
any changes in the law which might be necessary.
II.

THE PROBLEM-A WINDFALL DISCHARGE?

Professor White dramatically illustrated the problem of who qualifies as "the holder" in section 3-407(2)(a) with the following
hypothetical:
[A]ssume that a thief steals a $1,000 bearer check and alters the
amount to $11,000. The thief then cashes the check at a depositary
bank. Upon the presentment to the payor bank, payment is refused
because customer has ordered payment stopped. If the thief is a
'holder,' and assuming that the depositary bank is not a holder in due
course [assume, for example, that the check is overdue (Section 3304)], the literal application of 3-407 gives the drawer-purchaser perfectly good merchandise for which he did not have to pay; neither the
seller nor the depositary bank will have a cause of action against anyone (due to the discharge). This resultant windfall tot7the drawer-purchaser is undesirable. How, then, can one avoid it?
As Professor White suggests by this hypothetical, something is "rotten in the state of Denmark." A purchaser who gives a check in payment
15. Federal Trade Commission Holder-In-Due-Course Regulations, 16 C.F.R. §§ 433.1-.3
(1978).
16. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws has already proposed
the Uniform Consumer Credit Code for passage by state legislatures. In addition, a committee
working under the auspices of the Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code has
produced several drafts of proposed modifications to Articles 3 and 4. See Brandel & Geary, Electronic Fund Transfers and the New Payments Code, 37 Bus. LAW. 1065, 1072 (1982); Brandel &
Soloway, Electronic Fund Transfers and the New Payments Code, 38 Bus. LAW. 1355, 1360 (1983);
Miller, Report on the New Payments Code, 41 Bus. LAW. 1007 (1986); Miller, Report on the New
Payments Code, 40 Bus. LAW. 1139 (1985); Miller, A Report on the New Payments Code, 39 Bus.
LAW. 1215 (1984).
17. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, THE HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, § 15-5, at 604 n.57 (2d ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as WHITE & SUMMERS]. Other
illustrations of the problem may be found in Dugan, supra note 14 passim.
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of goods should not, in the end, be able to keep those goods without
paying for them. In addition, it seems unreasonable that the depositary
bank, which is not a holder in due course for reasons completely unrelated to the alteration, may not enforce the check for at least the original
tenor, the amount the purchaser-drawer of the check agreed to pay in the
beginning. So unfair seemed the situation to Professor White that he
questioned whether the windfall discharge permitted by section 3-407 did
more harm than good, and whether it might be better if it were
removed. 18
The above hypothetical may seem an isolated factual situation
which, although dealt with harshly by the Code, will rarely occur. After
all, usually the party who takes from the thief will be a holder in due
course and be able to sue the drawer for the amount of the original
tenor.1 9 If the party who takes from the thief is not a holder in due
course, it is usually because he took with notice of the alteration; 20 in
such a case, the party is perhaps legitimately punished for doing so.
Also, the drawer of the check may have had it stolen from him, as in
Professor White's hypothetical, so that he never gave the check in return
for goods; thus, if discharged, he is not unjustly enriched because he
never received the goods.
Indeed, both Professors White and Dugan, in exploring the problem, have suggested that the problem does exist, but that it is nothing to
get terribly excited about. Professor White entitled his original article
that explored the problem, "Some Petty Complaints About Article 3"
and in it stated that none of the complaints he made were "fundamental"; they were "petty" at least in the sense that no cases had yet manifested any difficulty with the problem. 21 Professor Dugan, who wrote in
reply to Professor White's article, suggested that the problem arose in
"several unusual factual situations." 22
Neither Professor White nor Professor Dugan, however, approached the problem head on. Instead, both directed their articles at
the more general problem concerning the interpretation of the "holder"
definition under several sections of the Code. The interpretive problem
of "holder" specifically in section 3-407(2)(a) was only a part of their
discussions. In addition, the issue addressed by both professors was
whether a thief could or should be a holder; therefore, their factual situations always involved a thief who either stole a bearer instrument or an
instrument made payable to the order of the thief. The narrow scope of
18. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 17, at 605.
19. U.C.C. § 3-407(3) (1977).
20. U.C.C. § 3-304(1)(a) (1977) would thus put the taker on notice of a claim or defense so that
the taker would not be a holder in due course under § 3-302(l)(c).
21. White, supra note 13, at 1315.
22. Dugan, supra note 14, at 1.
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the issue they addressed thus limited their view of the interpretive problem and made it seem somewhat petty and remote.
One need not, however, think of this problem arising only with a
thief. Take, for example, the simple factual situation in which a purchaser gives a seller a check in return for goods delivered to him. The
seller, who would ordinarily be a holder under the Code, fraudulently
and materially alters the check before depositing it in his depositary bank
or negotiating it to a third party. Assume the drawee bank does not pay
the check because there are insufficient funds in the drawer's account,
since the altered check is for a much larger amount than the drawerpurchaser intended. If the depositary bank or the third party, as the case
may be, is a holder in due course, then either could enforce the check
against the drawer-purchaser for at least the original tenor. Thus, the
drawer-purchaser would get no windfall since he would be paying exactly
what he contracted to pay for the goods. If, however, the depositary
bank or the third party is not a holder in due course, then the result is
that suggested by Professor White: a windfall discharge to the drawerpurchaser and a complete loss to the depositary bank or the third party.
If the reason the depositary bank or the third party is not a holder in due
course is something unrelated to the alteration (Professor White's suggestion of an overdue check is an excellent example), 23 then it seems a harsh
result that neither party could sue even for the original tenor.
This hypothetical situation without a thief, of course, is perhaps subject to the same criticism that Professors White and Dugan leveled
against their own hypotheticals. 24 Ordinarily, it would not produce a
windfall discharge because the depositary bank or the third party will
generally be a holder in due course. In addition, if a holder in due course
has taken from the person who altered the check, subsequent non-holders
in due course may be protected by the shelter provision. 25 In short, the
problem may exist, but is it likely to occur?
Such criticism might indeed be valid if the holder in due course doctrine had not been so successfully attacked in the past and if the likelihood of future attack were not so imminent. Although the assault on the
holder in due course citadel perhaps began with Unico v. Owen 26 in 1967,
the most serious assault 27 against the doctrine came in May of 1976 when
the Federal Trade Commission passed a regulation 28 making it an unfair
23. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 17, at 604 n.57.
24. Supra notes 21 & 22.

25. U.C.C. § 3-201(1) (1977).
26. 50 N.J. 101, 232 A.2d 405 (1967).

27. The Uniform Consumer Credit Code, drafted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws but not universally accepted, represents a lesser assault. UNIF. CONSUMER CREDIT CODE (1968 Act), 7 U.L.A. 233 (1978); UNIF. CONSUMER CREDIT CODE (1974

Act), 7 U.L.A. 583 (1978).
28. Federal Trade Commission Holder-In-Due-Course Regulations, supra note 15.
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or deceptive act for a seller to take a consumer credit contract 29 which
failed to include certain boldface language. The effect of that language is
to abolish holder in due course status for any holder of promissory notes
within the scope of the F.T.C. regulations. 30 Thus, the F.T.C. regulations have created and will continue to create a large class of note holders
who cannot be holders in due course and who thus cannot seek the protection of section 3-407(3) in the event of a fraudulent and material alteration of a note by a prior holder.
In addition, the "3-4-8" Committee of the U.C.C.'s Permanent Editorial Board drafted a provision for the abolition of holder in due course
status for transferees of consumer checks in the Uniform New Payments
Code.3 ' Although this provision, along with other consumer related provisions, is no longer being considered, 32 if Congress or the individual
state legislatures eventually pass such a provision, a large class of check
holders will be created who cannot be holders in due course and, like the
note holders mentioned above, cannot seek the protection of section 3407(3) in the event of a fraudulent and material alteration of a check by a
prior holder.
With these developments, consider the hypothetical situation in
which a dealer sells an appliance to a consumer for $500, and the consumer, without any negligence contributing to a later alteration, 33 either
writes a check for it or signs a promissory note. The dealer then skillfully raises the amount in the check or promissory note and negotiates
the instrument to a third party who takes the paper. Finally, the check is
not paid by the drawee bank or the promissory note is not paid by the
maker. Assuming the promissory note is covered under the F.T.C. regulations and the check under legislation similar to the consumer check
provisions of the Uniform New Payments Code, holder in due course
status will be taken away from the innocent third party who was unaware
of the alteration. Assuming the dealer has skipped town, the consumer
29.

16 C.F.R. § 433.1(i) (1978).

30. Although authorities generally agree on the effect of the F.T.C. language on holder in due
course status, some confusion exists as to why the language has that effect. See 2 F. HART & W.
WILLIER, BENDER'S UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERVICE 11-69 (1984); 4 W. HAWKLAND & L.
LAWRENCE, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERIES § 3-302:09, at 386 (1984); WHITE & SUMMERS,

supra note 17, at 1138. For dicta in case opinions citing the effect without surmising the reason for
the effect, see Federal Trade Comm'n v. Winters Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 601 F.2d 395 (6th Cir.
1979) and National Auto. Dealers Assoc. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 421 F. Supp. 31 (M.D. La.

1976). For dicta in court opinion citing effect and reason, see De La Fuente v. Home Say. Assoc.,
669 S.W.2d 137 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984). But cf R. ANDERSON, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 524,
527 (1984)(that the F.T.C. language has abolished holder in due course status is an overbroad
interpretation).
31. Benfield, The New Payments Code and the Abolition of Holder in Due Course Status as to
Consumer Checks, 40 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 11 (1983); Brandel & Soloway, supra note 16, at 1363.
32.

Miller, Report on the New Payments Code, 41 Bus. LAW. 1007 (1986).

33. The consumer's negligence which substantially contributes to a material alteration would
preclude the consumer from asserting the alteration. U.C.C. § 3-406 (1977).
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has a windfall discharge, and the third party, by force of regulation or
legislation, loses everything.
Of course, each of the above hypotheticals assumes that the altering
party is "the holder" under section 3-407(2)(a) and that the resulting
windfall discharge was intended by the drafters. Exactly who the drafters intended to include by the phrase "the holder" in section 3-407(2)(a)
and whether that holder's acts can discharge another party's contract as
to a third party has been the subject of debate.
III.

ANALYSIS OF WHO QUALIFIES AS HOLDER UNDER

SECTION 3-407(2)(a)
Most of the law review articles on section 3-407 ignore the issue of
who qualifies as the holder under section 3-407(2)(a). 34 If there is a standard interpretation, it is that the term "the holder" in section 3-407(2)(a)
means "a holder." In other words, a fraudulent and material alteration
by any holder will result in the discharge of any party whose contract has
been changed. At the opposite pole is the interpretation that "the
holder" means only the plaintiff in an action on an altered note or check;
that is, the maker's or drawer's contract is discharged only as to the
wrongdoer/holder who both fraudulently and materially altered the
instrument.
Hart and Willier acknowledge that use of the article "the" rather
than "a" to describe the holder in section 3-407 has created confusion. 35
Logically, however, they state that
[i]f the plaintiff is a subsequent holder in due course against whom an
alteration may be afforded only a limited discharge, then "the holder"
must necessarily refer to some holder prior to the plaintiff. It follows
that "the" means "a"; and thus, the maker must only show that a
holder, as opposed to a stranger or even a non-holder
transferee, some36
where up the line committed the alleged act.
Without even discussing whether "the" means "a", other writers simply
substitute "a" for "the" when discussing section 3-407(2)(a). 37
Professor White certainly agrees with the standard interpretation.
In his example of the thief who fraudulently makes a material alteration
on a stolen check, the third party to whom the check is negotiated finds
that the drawer of the check is discharged if the third party is not a
holder in due course and the thief is a holder. 38 Professor White, in his
early law review article, even proposed a revision 39 of section 3-407(2)(a)
34. See supra note 9.
35. 2 F. HART & W. WILLIER, supra note 30, at 5-19. They admit that using the article "the"
rather than "a" to describe the holder could be interpreted to mean that the holder who is plaintiff
must have been the wrongdoer.
36. Id.
37. 4 W. HAWKLAND & L. LAWRENCE, supra note 30, § 3-407:02, at 617 (1984).
38. White, supra note 13, at 1317.
39. Id. at 1338. Professor White's proposed revision is as follows: "Alteration which is both
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which substituted "a" for "the" exactly as called for by Hart and Willier.
He echoes Hart and Willier's reasoning that "the" could not actually
mean "the" in section 3-407(2)(a) because such an interpretation would
"render superfluous section 3-407(3) and the introductory phrase, 'other
4
than a subsequent holder in due course' of subsection (2)."
Other than the discomfort one may feel in boldly stating that the
drafters used "the" in section 3-407(2)(a) when they really meant "a",
the primary criticism of the standard interpretation of "the holder" is the
windfall discharge mentioned earlier. Professor White, after recommending that "the" be changed to "a" in his proposed revision of section
3-407(2)(a), suggested (in a footnote) the abolition of the discharge provi41
sion because of its windfall effect.
As noted previously, Professor Steinheimer first recognized the interpretive problem concerning the holder in section 3-407(2)(a) and suggested the possibility that "the holder" might refer to "the holder at the
time the claim is made and the defense asserted" rather than to "any
holder."'42 Professor Dugan, as mentioned earlier, took up Professor
Steinheimer's suggestion and proposed that "the holder" means the
plaintiff who seeks to recover on the instrument. 43 Rather than looking
to the language of section 3-407(2)(a) to find support for his interpretation, Professor Dugan hypothesized a suit in which the plaintiff sought to
recover on an instrument.4 In such a suit, the plaintiff would ordinarily
be entitled to recover upon the production of the instrument under section 3-307(2), unless, of course, the defendant presented a defense. In
that case, suppose the defense were a fraudulent and material alteration
under section 3-407(2)(a) which the defendant contends should discharge
him on the instrument. In asserting this defense, the defendant must,
according to Professor Dugan, demonstrate the existence of an alteration
by "the holder" as called for by section 3-407(2)(a). Assuming that the
plaintiff is not the one who altered the instrument, the plaintiff could
successfully rebut the defense by showing that he, the present holder, did
not alter the instrument. Since "the holder" means just that in the suit
under Professor Dugan's interpretation, section 3-407(2)(a) does not apply to discharge the defendant on the instrument.
Professor Dugan's proposed interpretation seems to have happy results. It avoids the prickly problems raised by Professor White as to
fraudulent and materialby a holder who acquiredpossession by delivery discharges any party whose
contract is thereby changed unless that party assents or is precluded from asserting the defense." Id.
40. Id. at 1338 n.70.
41. Id. Professor White has continued to disapprove the windfall discharge effect of § 3407(2)(a) and to suggest its abolition. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 17, at 605 n.57.
42. R. STEINHEIMER, MICHIGAN NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW, supra note 10, at 92;
Steinheimer, Impact of the Commercial Code, supra note 10, at 185. He did not, however, suggest
which interpretation was correct.
43. Dugan, supra note 14, at 22.
44. Id.
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whether a thief can or should be a holder, 45 and it eliminates the ill effects of the windfall discharge 46 for which even Professor White criticized his own interpretation.
Professor Dugan's interpretation also eliminates the need seen by
Professor White to amend section 3-407(2)(a) by substituting "a" for
"the" before "holder." Indeed, Professor Dugan's thesis was that the
problems suggested by Professor White in Article 3 were not the result of
the drafters' ineptitude, but rather because of incomplete interpretation
47
of the relevant Code sections.
Professor White's reply to Dugan's proposed interpretation would
presumably be the same as his response to Professor Steinheimer's suggestion that "the holder" might possibly mean "the holder at the time
claim is made and the defense asserted." '48 According to Professor
White, to interpret "the holder" to mean the holder who instituted the
suit would render superfluous section 3-407(3) as to the holder in due
course and the introductory phrase, "other than a subsequent holder in
49
due course," in subsection 2.
Such a response to Professor Dugan's analysis of "the holder" certainly has merit. If "the holder" of section 3-407(2)(a) means the "plaintiff holder" so that the section applies only when a plaintiff holder makes
a material and fraudulent alteration on an instrument, a plaintiff holder
who has not made such an alteration would never need to seek holder in
due course status under section 3-407(3) in order to sue for the original
tenor. Under section 3-407(2)(b), which covers all situations not expressly covered by section 3-407(2)(a), the non-altering plaintiff holder,
whether a holder in due course or not, may sue for the original tenor or
the completed amount, as the case may be.
Both interpretations of "the holder" under section 3-407(2)(a) leave
one feeling somewhat uneasy. Professor White's interpretation requires
one to read the language of section 3-407(2)(a) differently from the way it
was drafted and would sometimes result in an undeserved windfall discharge to a purchaser-drawer/maker and a harsh penalty to an innocent
third party. Professor Dugan's interpretation, however, allows one to
read the language as the drafters actually wrote it and eliminates the ill
effects of the windfall discharge, but it unfortunately obviates a signifi45. White, supra note 13 passim.
46. Of course, a purchaser, whether as drawer or maker, may still obtain a windfall discharge
even under Professor Dugan's interpretation if his seller fraudulently and materially alters the instrument, and then sues the purchaser on it. The seller could not enforce the instrument because of
section 3-407(2)(a) since he, as plaintiff and holder, made the fraudulent and material alteration, but
presumably the seller's punishment and the purchaser's windfall would be justified in light of the
seller's fraudulent action. At any rate, no innocent third party would suffer in such a case.
47. Dugan, supra note 14, at 2.
48.

R.

STEINHEIMER,

MICHIGAN NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW, supra note 10, at 92;

Steinheimer, Impact of the Commercial Code, supra note 10, at 185.
49. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 17, at 604 n.57; White, supra note 13, at 1338 n.70.
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cant portion of section 3-407. No other interpretation for "the holder" in
section 3-407(2)(a) has been offered, and the phrase itself does not appear
susceptible to a third interpretation. Thus, a conclusive answer as to the
identity of "the holder" under section 3-407(2)(a) cannot be found in the
statutory language and must be sought elsewhere.
IV.

THE COMMON LAW RULE BEFORE CODIFICATION

Neither Professor White nor Professor Dugan offer any authority
for their interpretations other than the express language of section 3-407
or the logic behind the section. If they had examined the prior law of
alteration, they did not mention it in their articles. Nevertheless, justification for certain statutory language and its interpretation may often be
found in the common law as it stood prior to a statute, or in previous
statutory provisions.
The provisions of the U.C.C., of course, evolved from the common
law of England and America and from later codifications in both Great
Britain and America. Section 3-407(2)(a)'s phrase, "the holder" should
thus be examined in light of that prior law. Although such an examination suggests no new interpretation for "the holder," it supports the standard interpretation that "the holder" means "a holder." Paradoxically,
that same examination reveals that, in light of the great changes in the
law of alteration over the past century, section 3-407(2)(a) no longer furthers the theory and policy of that prior law which supports the standard
interpretation.
The official comments of the U.C.C. state that section 3-407 is derived from the Negotiable Instruments Law, the first American codification of the law of negotiable instruments.50 The ancestry of section 3-407
can, however, be traced further to the common law existing in America
prior to the promulgation of the uniform law.51 The American common
law, of course, had its roots in the common law of England.
A.

The English Source of the Common Law Rule

In the case of Wood v. Steele,52 the United States Supreme Court
considered the effect of an alteration upon a negotiable instrument. The
Court applied the rule that "a material alteration in any commercial pa50. U.C.C. § 3-407 comment (prior uniform statutory provision) (1977).
51. Fairfax Leary, Jr., assistant reporter for Article 3 and the initial reporter for Article 4,
states the following as the source material studied by the reportorial staff of the Code charged with
the responsibility for Article 3: the Negotiable Instruments Law, fifty-odd years of court decisions
under that uniform act, the common law prior to the Negotiable Instruments Law, the British Bills
of Exchange Act and the decisions interpreting it, the various law review articles written about both
statutes, and, in particular, the celebrated controversy between Judge Brewster and Dean Ames of
Harvard. Leary, CommercialPaper:Some Aspects of Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 48
Ky. L.J. 198, 202 (1960).
52. 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 80 (1867). A material alteration as to the date discharged completely a
surety as against an innocent holder.
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per, without the consent of the party sought to be charged, extinguishes
his liability,"'5 3 a representative statement of the common law rule as it
was applied in America. The Court traced the rule to the time of Eds4 when an erasure in a deed would
ward III
avoid it. The rule evolved
more fully in Henry Pigot's Case55 when the King's Bench held that
when any deed 56 is altered in a point material, by the plaintiff himself,
or by any stranger, without the privity 57 of the obligee, be it by interlineation, addition, rasing, or by drawing of a pen through a line, or
through the midst of any material word, ... the deed thereby becomes
void ....58

Pigot's Case does not mention the policy for this rule, but one may at
least conclude the theory supporting discharge from the plea allowed the
defendant: non est factum, 59 that it is not his deed. 6° After alteration,
the instrument is no longer the obligor's and thus cannot be enforced
against him.
Samuel Williston suggested that the original reason a deed was discharged by alteration was that "the deed was itself the obligation, not
merely the evidence of it, and if the deed ceased to exist in its original
form the obligation necessarily ceased." '6 1 Although Pigot's Case did not
suggest such a theory for discharge, Williston's suggestion seems to fit
53. Id. at 82.
54. Edward III was King of England from 1327 to 1377.
55. 77 Eng. Rep. 1177 (1614). Henry Pigot signed a bond for the payment of money to Benedict Winchcombe, Esq., on the condition that George Watkins would appear in the King's Bench to
answer to George Cottle in a plea of trespass. Apparently, George Watkins did not appear and
Benedict Winchcombe, who happened to be the Sheriff of Oxford County, sued Henry Pigot on the
bond. In defense, Pigot claimed that the bond had been altered after he signed it by the insertion of
"Sheriff of the County of Oxford" after Winchcombe's name. The jury found that an alteration had
indeed been made. Id. at 1178.
56. The term "deed" used in Pigot's Case does not have the narrow meaning it has today. The
broader meaning of "deed" is "a writing sealed and delivered by the parties," BALLENTINE'S LAW
DICTIONARY 318 (3d ed. 1969), a definition broad enough to include a bond or a covenant in a deed,
both of which had to be under seal in the time of Edward III. Indeed, Pigot's Case does not involve a
suit on a deed of conveyance of real estate, but rather an action on a bond.
57. Sine notitia in Latin or "without notice" as we know it in English today.
58. Pigot's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 1178. The opinion in Pigot's Case goes into further detail:
So if the obligee himself alters the deed by any of the said ways, although it is in words not
material, yet the deed is void: but if a stranger, without his privity, alters the deed by any of
the said ways in any point not material, it shall not avoid the deed.
Id. Pigot was ultimately held liable on the bond. After stating the rules on alteration, the court
concluded, "And therefore in the principal case, the addition made by a stranger, without the privity
of the plaintiff, being in a point not material for any thing that appears to the Court; for this cause,
judgment was given for the plaintiff .... Id.
59. Id. at 1177.
60. Non est factum has also been interpreted to mean "there was no such document, or covenant." C. REMBAR, THE LAW OF THE LAND 225 (1980).
61. Williston, Discharge of Contractsby Alteration, 18 HARV. L. REV. 105, 107 (1904). Oliver
Wendell Holmes had earlier suggested the same reason for the rule. He wrote, "This rule comes
down to us from a time when the contract contained in a sealed instrument was bound so indissolubly to the substance of the document that the soul perished with the body when the latter was
destroyed or changed in its identity for any cause." Bacon v. Hooker, 177 Mass. 335, 337, 58 N.E.
1078, 1079 (1901). Greenleaf suggests a similar idea: "The instrument derives its legal virtue from
its being the sole repository of the agreement of the parties, solemnly adopted as such, and attested
by the signature of the party engaging to perform it." S.GREENLEAF, A TREATISE ON TIlE LAW OF

EVIDENCE § 565, at 704 (16th ed. 1899).
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well with the plea of non estfactum allowed in Pigot's Case. According
to Williston, the original unaltered deed was entirely destroyed by the
alteration and thus could not be enforced against the obligor. According
to Pigot's Case and its plea of non estfactum, the resulting altered bond
was a new instrument and not the bond of the obligor so that neither the
new nor the original bond could be enforced. Although Williston's reason for discharge lost significance as courts of equity and later courts of
law began to accept secondary evidence of a deed, 62 the plea allowed in
Pigot's Case, non estfactum, and the theory implied by it became part of
63
the American common law rule.
The rule in Pigot's Case was originally applicable only to the alteration of an instrument required to be under seal, such as a bond or a deed.
Although both a bill of exchange 64 and a promissory note are similar to a
bond for the payment of money, 65 neither instrument was originally required to be under seal, and thus the holding in Pigot's Case as to alteration did not automatically apply to them.
Whether the rule in Pigot's Case should be extended to apply to an
instrument not under seal, such as a bill of exchange, finally arose in the
famous English case of Master v. Miller.66 In Miller, Peele and Company
drew a bill of exchange on Miller, payable three months after its date to
Wilkinson and Cook. Miller, the drawee and the defendant in the suit,
accepted the bill of exchange, and Peele and Company delivered the bill
to Wilkinson and Cook. Apparently, the date of the bill of exchange was
altered while it was in the hands of Wilkinson and Cook. At any rate, an
ink blot appeared over the date so that March 26 looked like March 20,
thus advancing the time of payment of the bill of exchange. In addition,
the notation "June 23" was added, indicating the time of payment based
62. Williston, supra note 61, at 108.
63. See Gardner v. Fleetwood, 39 Ga. App. 51, 146 S.E. 127 (1928); Peevey v. Buchanan, 131
Tenn. 24, 173 S.W. 447 (1915); 2 T. PARSONS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PROMISSORY NOTES
AND BILLS OF EXCHANGE 580 (1863); Williston, Dischargeof Contractsby Alteration, 18 HARV. L.
REV. 165, 179 (1905).
64. Today, we would call this instrument a draft rather than a bill of exchange.
65. Not only did the bill of exchange become a contract to pay money when it was accepted by
the drawee, but it, like the bond or deed, was itself the obligation and not merely evidence of it.
Williston, supra note 61, at 112. Williston quoted Justice Holmes in Blackstone v. Miller, 188 U.S.
189, 206 (1903). "Bonds and negotiable instruments are more than merely evidences of debt. The
debt is inseparable from the paper which declares and constitutes it, by a tradition which comes
down from more archaic conditions." Id. This aspect of a negotiable instrument is known as the
"doctrine of merger."
Merger means that, once an obligation has been put into the form of a negotiable instrument, the obligation must be dealt with through dealings in the instrument. The instrument is not merely the best evidence of the current state of the obligation. Rather, the
instrument is the obligation. The obligation has become locked up in the instrument in
such a way that interests not indicated on the instrument are subordinated to the rights

which the instrument contains.
E. PETERS, A NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS PRIMER 40 (2d ed. 1974).

66. 100 Eng. Rep. 1042 (1791). The United States Supreme Court also recognized Master v.
Miller, as well as Pigot's Case, as the source of the common law rule on alteration which it applied in
Wood v. Steele, 63 U.S. (6 Wall.) 80 (1867).
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on the altered date of March 20. Sometime later, Wilkinson and Cook
endorsed the bill to the plaintiffs, Master and others, for valuable consideration. Miller later refused to pay the bill of exchange, and the plaintiffs
sued.
The result of Master v. Miller was, perhaps, inevitable. The three
judges in Master v. Miller who agreed that the rule in Pigot's Case should
be extended to the bill of exchange seemed to believe that the policy underlying the rule in Pigot's Case, rather than the similarity between the
bond and the bill of exchange, required the extension of the rule. Lord
Kenyon, the chief judge, asked rhetorically, "[W]hy, in point of policy,
would [the alteration] have ... that effect [avoidance] in a deed?" 67 He
answered his own question by responding, "Because no man shall be permitted to take the chance of committing a fraud, without running any
risk of losing by the event, when it is detected. ' 68 If that same policy
applied to the alteration of a bill of exchange, then the rule of Pigot's
Case should, Lord Kenyon thought, be extended to the bill of exchange
under the proposition that "the law went as far as the policy."' 69 Naturally, the same policy did apply to the alteration of a bill of exchange. "It
is one of the greatest importance," wrote Lord Kenyon, "that these instruments which are circulated throughout Europe, should be kept with
the utmost purity, and that the sanctions to preserve them from fraud
should not be lessened."' 70 Thus, the alteration of the bill of exchange
avoided it, and Lord Kenyon would not allow the holders to recover on
it.
7
Judge Buller was the only judge who disagreed in Master v. Miller. '
He did not generally dispute the extension of the rule in Pigot's Case to
the bill of exchange, but he did vigorously deny that the rule should be
applied to the facts of Master v. Miller to discharge the obligation of the
drawee. In objecting to the outcome of the rule's application in the case
before him, he discussed several issues which later became important
with respect to "the holder" of section 3-407(2)(a): the problem of the
windfall discharge, the status of the bona fide purchaser for value, the
relevance of fraudulent intention in alteration, and the problem of alteration by a stranger.
Judge Buller's overall concern in Master v. Miller was that the defendant would have a windfall discharge if the court did not allow the
plaintiffs to enforce the bill of exchange. 72 He noted that the bill of exchange was given for a full and valuable consideration, that the plaintiffs
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Master v. Miller, 100 Eng. Rep. 1042, 1047 (1791).
Id.
Id. at 1048.
Id. at 1047.
Id. at 1048.
Id.
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were honest and innocent holders of it, and that the defendant had the
amount of the bill in his hands. He would therefore have allowed the
plaintiffs to recover from the defendant, either on the instrument itself or
on the basis of money had and received. Said Judge Buller, "The defendant has got that money in his pocket, which in justice and conscience the
plaintiffs ought to have, and therefore they are entitled to recover it
....
Judge Buller's complaint is remarkably similar to that of Profes74
sor White some 250 years later.
",

A second issue raised by Judge Buller arose out of his description of
the plaintiffs as honest and innocent holders of the bill of exchange for a
full and valuable consideration. 75 The facts were certain that the plaintiffs did give value for the bill of exchange and that they did not alter the
instrument, since the blot and the insertion of "June 23" were made
before the bill of exchange was delivered to the plaintiffs. 76 The jury
never found that the plaintiffs did not take with notice as a result of the
alteration, but none of the three judges who applied the rule to the detriment of the plaintiffs suggested that the plaintiffs had taken it in bad faith
or with knowledge of the alterations. Judge Buller maintained that the
plaintiffs were honest and innocent holders of the bill of exchange. In
short, Judge Buller suggested that a party who took an instrument for
value, in good faith and without notice, should be allowed to recover the
amount of the bill of exchange despite the alteration. As discussed later
in this article, Judge Buller's objection to allowing a bona fide purchaser
for value (the counterpart of our modern holder in due course) to lose in
this situation would await recognition until passage of the Bills of Exchange Act in Great Britain and the Negotiable Instruments Law in
America. For the time being, however, the English common law rule
steadfastly provided that alteration was the type of defense that could be
asserted against a bona fide purchaser for value even as to the original
73. Id. at 1052.
74. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 17. Judge Buller's recognition that a windfall discharge
existed did not go unnoticed, although it certainly went unheeded. John Faquhar Fraser of Lincoln's Inn, a Barrister-at-Law, annotated cases appearing in the English Reports with notes and
references to other cases. In his annotation of Pigot's Case, he naturally cited Master v. Miller and
the rule which it established. Without reference to Judge Buller's concern over the windfall discharge, he noted, "And when the acceptance of a bill is altered in the material part by the holder,
neither he nor any claiming through him can recover upon the bill." Pigot's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at
1179. Out of this rule, of course, comes the windfall discharge. Fraser cites two English cases for
this proposition, both of which arose after Master v. Miller: Tidmarsh v. Grover, 105 Eng. Rep. 274
(1813) and Cowie v. Halsall, 106 Eng. Rep. 910 (1821). Neither of these cases expressly states
Fraser's rule, but the described result is obvious. In each case, the drawer drew a bill of exchange to
himself on a second party who accepted the bill of exchange. Later the drawer/payee negotiated the
bill of exchange to a third party who then sued the acceptor. In each case, however, the drawer/
payee had made an alteration that both courts determined was material. Also, in each case, the third
party, who was the endorsee of the drawer/payee, could not enforce the instrument, leaving the
acceptor with the windfall discharge.
75. Master v. Miller, 100 Eng. Rep. 1042, 1048 (1791).
76. Id. at 1050.
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tenor. 77
A third issue raised by Judge Buller was the issue of fraud. He
asked for what purpose the alteration was made in this case. In discussing the blot over the date, he said, "[W]e do not find that it was done for
any bad purpose, or with any improper view whatever. Upon this finding, the Court are bound to say it was done innocently. '78 In discussing
the insertion of "June 23" on the bill of exchange, he said, "[B]ut was it
done fraudulently? The answer is, it was not, and therefore it is of no
avail. So here the jury have not said it was done fraudulently; and therefore it affords no objection. ' 79 Unfortunately, as discussed later, Judge
Buller's analysis would await realization until the U.C.C. proposed that
an alteration must be both material and fraudulent before discharge
occurs.
Judge Buller raised a fourth issue in his opinion by asking who made
the blot on the bill of exchange and who put the insertion on the bill of
exchange.80 The jury, he commented, did not answer either question.
He pushed the issue no further, perhaps because the rule in Pigot's Case
had plainly stated that a material alteration by the plaintiff or "by any
stranger" would avoid the deed.8 1 The outcome in Master v. Miller, of
course, was that the bill of exchange was discharged despite the fact that
no one knew who made the alterations. Thus, it remained the English
rule that a person who altered the instrument need not be the holder; so
long as he altered the instrument, a stranger, such as an agent of the
obligor or of the obligee acting without authority, or a thief or other
wrongful possessor, would avoid it just the same as if the alteration were
by the holder. 82 As will be discussed later, the American rule would
develop differently.
This examination of the source of the common law rule in England
does more than merely trace the development of the rules on alteration
for negotiable instruments. It also shows that the theory behind the
rule-that the instrument cannot be enforced because its identity is destroyed-and the policy behind the rule-to prevent and punish tampering-were both articulated when the rule was first applied, suggesting the
importance of both theory and policy to those early judges who applied
the rule despite its harsh effects. As discussed in the following section,
both theory and policy remained in full bloom alongside the English
77. See infra note 84 and accompanying text.
78.
79.

100 Eng. Rep. at 1050.
Id.

80. Id.
81. Pigot's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 1177, 1178 (1614).
82. W. BRITrON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF BILLS AND NOTES § 280, at 1061 (1943); 2 J.
DANIEL, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS § 1373, at 336 (1876); 2 T.
PARSONS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PROMISSORY NOTES AND BILLS OF EXCHANGE 574 (2d ed.

1879).
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common law rule as they crossed the Atlantic to be incorporated in the
American common law rule.
Examination of the English common law rule shows, in addition,
that the windfall discharge issue was recognized in Master v. Miller, the
very first case in which the rule on alteration was applied to a negotiable
instrument. Judge Buller's complaint about the windfall discharge suggests that its ill effects did not result from the standard interpretation of
"the holder" in U.C.C. section 3-407(2)(a), but rather were present from
the time the rule was first extended to a negotiable instrument. Thus, the
early English common law rule seems to support the standard interpretation of section 3-407(2)(a), that "the holder" means "a holder," since any
holder who altered an instrument discharged it for a subsequent holder
under the earliest rule. Presumably, the harsh result of this interpretation was justified by the theory and policy articulated by the early English judges.
Finally, examination of the English common law origin suggests
three additional issues: the status of the bona fide purchaser for value,
the relevance of fraudulent intent, and the impact of alteration by a
stranger. These issues would be resolved by later codifications: the Negotiable Instruments Law (N.I.L.) and the U.C.C. Although none of
these issues seem to bear directly on the question of who the holder is
under U.C.C. 3-407(2)(a), the resolution of all three under later codifications will nevertheless help to suggest an answer.
B.

The Common Law Rule in America

Under the American common law prior to the N.I.L., the general
rule applicable to altered instruments was the same as the English common law rule: a material alteration of a negotiable instrument discharged a party who had not consented to the alteration.8 3 Like the
English common law rule, the discharge resulting from a material alteration of an instrument was, under the American common law rule, a real
defense which could be asserted even against what was then known as a
bona fide purchaser,8 4 a counterpart of our modern holder in due
course. 85
A pre-N.I.L. case which illustrates the use of material alteration as a
83. "This rule is so well established as to require no citation of authorities." Annot., 86 AM.
ST. REP. 80, 118 (1900). Nevertheless, see cases collected in Annot., 86 AM. ST. REP. 80, 82-83
(1900).
84. M. BIGELOW, THE LAW OF BILLS, NOTES, AND CHECKS 574 (2d ed. 1880); W. BRITTON,
supra note 82, § 285, at 1078; 1 I. EDWARDS, A TREATISE ON BILLS OF EXCHANGE § 244, at 192
(3d ed. 1882); W. MOORE & H. WILKIE, NORTON'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF BILLS AND NOTES

§ 105, at 319 (4th ed. 1914); 2 T. PARSONS, supra note 82, at 544; Williston, supra note 63, at 173;
see Annot., 86 AM. ST. REP. 80, 121 (1900) (cases collected). If the alteration was immaterial in that
it did not change the legal effect of the instrument, no discharge occurred. I J. AMES, A SELECTION
OF CASES ON THE LAW OF BILLS AND NOTES 449 (1894); Williston, supra note 63, at 166.
85.

1 J. DANIEL, supra note 82, § 769, at 576; 1 T. PARSONS, supra note 63, at 254.
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real defense against the bona fide purchaser is Wade v. Withington.86 In
this case, a holder of a promissory note sued the maker for $140. The
maker denied making the note, alleging that it had been fraudulently altered after it was signed by the addition of the words "and forty" to
make it appear to be a note for $140 instead of $100. When the maker
testified in court about the alteration of the note, the holder objected
because the alteration could not be detected by the most careful scrutiny
and because he maintained that the defense of alteration and its resulting
discharge was not open against him, a bona fide endorsee for valuable
consideration. The trial judge nevertheless allowed the maker to assert
the alteration against the holder, and the Massachusetts Supreme Court
affirmed. Thus, the discharge resulting from the alteration was successfully asserted against even a bona fide purchaser for value.
Case opinions prior to the N.I.L. expounded both theory and policy
for this discharge, windfall or otherwise, and the treatises of that day
echoed the same theory and policy. 87 The court in Wade v. Withington,
for example, said that the well settled doctrine, that a material alteration
of a bill or note vitiated the instrument except as against parties consenting to the alteration, rested on the principle that the parties can be
held liable only on their contract as originally made and entered into by
them. Once a material alteration is made without the privity of the party
liable upon it, said the court, the instrument ceases to be the maker's
contract and thus the instrument cannot be enforced at all against the
maker. The court then noted that the common law ordinarily gave peculiar sanction to negotiable paper like the note in this case in order to
secure its free circulation and to protect bona fide holders for value who
take it before maturity, just as the holder in this case had. However, the
court said that the protection ordinarily given bona fide holders for value
did not extend so far as to hold liable a party, like the maker in this case,
on a contract into which he had never entered and into which he had not
88
given his assent.
Gettysburg National Bank v. Chisholm 89 is a similar case which applied the common law rule for a materially altered instrument. The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court refused to allow a holder, who claimed to
be an innocent purchaser for value, 90 to sue on an altered instrument for
the original tenor. The instrument in that case had been materially altered by addition of "with interest at 6 percent," but the endorsee, who
86. 83 Mass. 561 (1883).
87. 2 J. DANIEL, supra note 82, § 1410, at 368; 2 T. PARSONS, supra note 82, at 582; Annot., 86
AM. ST. REP. 80, 83 (1900).
88. Wade v. Withington, 83 Mass. 561, 561 (1883).
89. 32 A. 730 (1895).
90. The court said that it was not proven, and it probably was not possible to prove, that the
endorsee acquired the note innocently because the interlineation "with interest at 6%" was apparent
on the face of the note and was sufficient to put the plaintiff on inquiry. Id. at 731.
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held the note, was quite willing to enforce it for only the original tenor.
The court nevertheless refused to enforce the altered instrument even for
the original tenor.
Instead of basing its decision on the theory that the maker's contract
had been destroyed by the alteration as held in Wade v. Withington, the
Gettysburg Bank court based its decision upon the public policy of imposing a severe penalty as a safeguard against tampering with written
instruments. The court's reason for refusing to allow even an innocent
purchaser for value to enforce the note for its original tenor was that
[i]f such were the law, forgeries by alteration would be protected by the
law. The fraudulent payee would run no risk of loss, because he would
only have to transfer the note to an indorsee, who might recover the
original amount of the note by simply proving that he was innocent of
the fraud. But the law is not so charitable to this class of persons. 9'
The court stated that the basis for denying enforcement even for the original tenor was the policy of discouraging fraud and alteration of instruments. 92 The resulting complete discharge, said the court, took away the
motive for alteration because the holder in effect forfeited the instrument
93
on discovery of the fraud.
Commonwealth v. ImmigrantIndustrialSavings Bank 94 summed up
both theory and policy for the rule of allowing alteration and its resulting
discharge as a real defense against even bona fide purchasers for value.
The court said,
[T]he reasons given in the text-books and adjudged cases for the rule
that a material alteration avoids a written instrument are two: first,
that no man shall be permitted on grounds of public policy, to take the
chance of committing a fraud without running any risk of losing by the
event when it is detected; the other, that the identity of the instrument
is destroyed. 9 5
Thus, the same theory and policy supporting both the English and the
American rules were deemed to justify the harshness of both.
The windfall discharge criticized by Judge Buller in Master v. Miller
could occur just as easily under the American common law rule as under
the English common law rule. For example, if the maker of the note in
Wade v. Withington had received goods or services in exchange for the
note, he would have received a windfall discharge at the expense of the
good faith holder for value when the court held the note discharged by
the alteration. Indeed, many pre-N.I.L. cases involved the same fact pattern as in Wade v. Withington with a possible windfall discharge at the
91. Id.

92. Id.
93. Id. at 732.
94. 98 Mass. 93 (1867).
95. Id. at 93. Alteration of several bonds in this case did not bring about discharge because the

alterations were not material.
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expense of a good faith holder for value. 96 No case, however, explicitly
mentions that a windfall occurs or complains about it, but it is evident
from the facts that a windfall could have occurred. Even Samuel Williston admitted that an obligor of an altered instrument may be able to keep
the consideration which he has received without giving any equivalent
97
value for it.
One case which did apparently recognize the windfall discharge resulting from alteration suggested a possible way to avoid that result. In
Hunt v. Grey,98 the plaintiff's agent sold a horse and took back a promissory note payable to the plaintiff. After showing the note to the plaintiff,
the agent then discounted the note at a bank and returned the proceeds
to the plaintiff. Unknown to the plaintiff, however, the bank had refused
to cash the note unless it was drawn payable without "discount." The
agent had therefore inserted the words "or discount" into the note prior
to discounting it to the bank. When the note was not paid at maturity,
the plaintiff took the note back from the bank and sued on it. The defendant, naturally, asserted the defense of discharge resulting from the
alteration. The court seemed somewhat offended at the defendant's position. It said,
The defendant in this case asks this court to decide that he may keep
the plaintiff's horse without paying anything for him, because the
agent of the plaintiff under an erroneous idea of his rights, made the
alteration in question, and which has not, in the least degree affected
the defendant. It is not often that a party can perpetrate a fraud by
force of the generality of legal rules; the defendant, certainly, cannot in
this case. 99
The court noted that there was no fraudulent intent in this case and that
although alteration avoided the note, it nevertheless left the original debt
unpaid. Thus, even though the note was ineffective as a result of the
alteration, the plaintiff was entitled to receive the agreed value of the
horse on the basis of the original debt. t°°
Hunt v. Grey shows that one small loophole did exist in the bar erected by the courts against a suit on an altered instrument. A holder of
an altered instrument might bring a suit not on the instrument itself but
on the underlying obligation for which the instrument was originally
given. 101
Originally, under the common law in England, neither a suit on the
96. See Fordyce v. Kosminski, 49 Ark. 40, 3 S.W. 892 (1887); Schwartz v. Wilmer, 90 Md. 136,
44 A. 1059 (1899); Washington Say. Bank v. Ecky, 51 Mo. 272 (1873); Benedict v. Cower, 49 N.Y.
396 (1872); Newman v. King, 54 Ohio St. 273, 43 N.E. 683 (1876).
97. Williston, supra note 63, at 177-78.
98. 35 N.J.L. 227 (1871).
99. Id. at 234.
100. Id.
101. See M. BIGELOW, supra note 84, at 577 (collected cases); W. BRiT-rON, supra note 82,
§ 286, at 1081 (collected cases); 1 1. EDWARDS, supra note 84, § 248, at 192 (collected cases); W.
MOORE & H. WILKIE, supra note 84, § 105, at 321 (collected cases); 2 T. PARSONS, supra note 82, at
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underlying obligation nor a suit on the altered instrument could be maintained.102 Later, however, the rule changed to allow a suit on the underlying obligation, and no distinction was made as to whether the
alteration of the instrument was fraudulent or innocent. 103
In contrast, under American common law, whether one could sue
on the underlying obligation or the altered instrument depended on
whether the alteration was made innocently or fraudulently. 10 4 The
common law rule, of course, did not require that the alteration be both
fraudulent and material. 105 Thus, a material alteration, whether fraudulent or not, avoided the instrument according to the strict language of the
common law rule. Courts in the United States, however, drew a distinction between an alteration made fraudulently and an alteration made innocently. 10 6 Many courts held that the holder could recover on a
materially altered instrument according to its original tenor if the alteration were innocent. 107 These courts, in effect, read into the common law
rule on altered instruments the requirement that the instrument be altered both fraudulently as well as materially, thus echoing Judge Buller's
concern in Master v. Miller that the intent with which an alteration was
made should be considered before automatically granting a discharge on
a material alteration. In other jurisdictions, however, courts held that an
alteration, whether innocent or fraudulent, avoided the instrument according to the strict common law rule, 108 which did not require fraud. 109
When the alteration was innocently made, these courts nevertheless allowed the holder to recover by suing on the underlying obligation for
which the altered instrument was given.' t0 If, however, the material alteration was fraudulently made, all courts agreed that the holder could
neither sue on the instrument nor on the underlying obligation."'
The crack in the bar on suits on the altered instrument, represented
by the suit on the underlying obligation, was very narrow. A suit on the
underlying obligation was possible only when two conditions were satisfied. First, the suit had to be between parties who had dealt with each
572 (collected cases); Williston, supra note 63, at 175 (collected cases); Note, Bills and NotesAlteration of Instruments-Spoilation, 19 OR. L. REV. 56, 58 (1939)(collected cases).

102. W. BRITTON, supra note 82, § 286, at 1081; Williston, supra note 63, at 175.
103. See supra note 102.
104. See M. BIGELOW, supra note 84, at 577 (collected cases); W. BRITTON, supra note 82,
§ 286, at 1082 (collected cases); 2 J. DANIEL, supra note 82, at § 1411 (collected cases); 1 I. EDWARDS, supra note 84, § 248, at 192 (collected cases); W. MOORE & H. WILKIE, supra note 84,
§ 105, at 321 (collected cases); Williston, supra note 63, at 175 (collected cases); Note, supra note
101, at 58 (collected cases).

105. See supra note 104.
106. See supra note 104.
107. See cases collected in Williston, supra note 61, at 115.

108.
whether
panying
109.
110.
111.

The term "strict common law rule" refers to the rule which made no distinction as to
the material alteration was fraudulently or innocently made. See supra note 105 and accomtext.
See cases collected in Williston, supra note 63, at 176.
Id.
Id. at 177.
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other in a transaction since there would otherwise be no underlying obligation on which to sue. For example, assume A made a note payable to
B for purchase of goods. B materially but innocently altered the note,
and then negotiated it to C. C could not sue A on the instrument under
the strict common law rule, which avoided even an innocently altered
instrument, so long as the alteration was material. Nor could he sue A
on the underlying obligation, because no obligation existed between A
and C. 112 If, however, B had not negotiated the note to C but instead
held it until maturity, under the strict common law rule he could not sue
A on the instrument, but he could sue A on the underlying obligation
which existed between them.
The second condition that reduced the possibility of a suit on the
underlying obligation was that the material alteration had to be innocently made. As stated above," 3 if the material alteration was fraudulently made, a holder (such as C in the above hypothetical) could sue
114
neither on the instrument nor on the underlying obligation.
The option of a suit on the underlying obligation therefore proved
valuable for the payee who innocently altered an instrument. It gave
little comfort, however, to the innocent purchaser (endorsee) for value
who took an altered instrument. Because there was no underlying obligation between the endorsee and the maker or drawer of the instrument,
the door for such a suit was closed, leaving the latter party's obligation
discharged and the endorsee with nothing to show for his purchase of the
instrument.1 5 Thus, even with the possibility of a suit on an underlying
obligation, an endorsee could still suffer the severe penalty resulting from
the common law rule-the windfall discharge. Without a doubt, the
American common law rule, even as modified by the alternative of a suit
on the underlying obligation, was still strongly supported by the original
rule's theory that the instrument, once altered, is destroyed and its underlying policy that tampering with an instrument must be punished.
One important element of the common law rule of alteration in
America was the spoilation doctrine.1 6 This doctrine was the American
common law's answer to Judge Buller's concerns in Master v. Miller over
112. Of course, C could sue B, with whom he did deal. Since B's alteration was innocently
made, B would probably still be available and cooperative in a suit against him by C. B could then
sue A on the underlying obligation.
113. See supra text accompanying note 111.
114. Even the payee could not sue on the instrument or the underlying obligation if the material
alteration was fraudulently made.
115. This result did not occur, of course, if the jurisdiction did not apply the strict common law
rule, thus allowing a suit on the instrument assuming the material alteration was innocent. Also, as
mentioned in note 112, the endorsee could in any case sue the payee who altered the instrument. If
the payee's alteration was innocent, the endorsee might recover because the payee would probably be
cooperative; however, if the payee's action was fraudulent, the endorsee might have trouble locating
him and enforcing a judgment.
116. See infra text accompanying notes 122-23.
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who had made the alteration.1 17 As previously noted, a material alteration of a negotiable instrument by anyone under the common law rule in
18
England discharged a party who did not consent to the alteration.'
Thus, the person who altered the instrument need not be the holder; indeed, even a stranger's alteration of the instrument would avoid it just as
effectively.
In America, however, the rule developed differently. An alteration
by a stranger did not avoid the instrument. 19 For example, in the previously mentioned case of Hunt v. Gray,1 2 0 the plaintiff's agent had inserted the words "or discount" into the note prior to discounting it to the
bank. When the note was not paid at maturity, the plaintiff sued on the
note, and the defendant asserted alteration as a defense. The court concluded that the alteration of the note by the plaintiff's agent was outside
the agency relationship and that the alteration must be regarded as if
done by a stranger. Although the court noted that under the English
rule the act of a stranger would avoid an instrument, it applied the
American rule that the act of a stranger could not invalidate the
instrument. 121
Alteration by a stranger under the American common law was usu122
ally called a "spoilation" which would not avoid the instrument.
Thus, under the American "doctrine of spoilation," the holder of an instrument altered by a stranger could still enforce the instrument for the
original tenor. 123 As will be explained later, the elimination of this doctrine under the N.I.L. and its later reemergence under the U.C.C. helps
explain the drafter's meaning of "the holder" in section 3-407(2)(a) and
provides support for the standard interpretation of that phrase.
Examination of the American common law rule on alteration suggests, as did the examination of the English common law rule, that the
windfall discharge of section 3-407 is not a result of the language used by
the U.C.C. drafters. Rather, the windfall discharge, rooted in the common law rule of England, was incorporated in the American common
law rule long before the U.C.C. was drafted. As suggested earlier, the
history of the windfall discharge seems to support the standard interpretation that "the holder," as drafted in section 3-407(2)(a), actually means
"a holder." Certainly, the standard interpretation is not incorrect merely
because it results in a windfall for the drawer/maker and a loss for an
117. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
118. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
119. See cases collected in M. BIGELOW, supra note 84, at 581; W. BRITTON, supra note 82,
§ 280, at 1061; 2 J. DANIEL, supra note 82, § 1373, at 337; 1 . EDWARDS, supra note 84, § 245, at
192; W. MOORE & H. WILKIE, supra note 84, § 105, at 320; Williston, supra note 61, at 114; Note,
supra note 101, at 56; Annot., supra note 83, at 102.
120. 35 N.J.L. 227 (1871).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 234.
123. See supra note 119.
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innocent holder, since the very same result occurred under the common
law rule both in England and America. In addition, the theory and policy behind the rule, both in England and America, presumably justified
the harsh result of the windfall discharge which also accompanies the
standard interpretation of the contemporary U.C.C. language.
The American common law rule generally followed the strict English rule. Like the English rule, it refused to give protection to the bona
fide purchaser for value who took a materially altered instrument; it continued the windfall discharge; and it reflected the theory and policy
which demanded a harsh result. In other ways, however, the American
common law rule relaxed the strictness of the English rule by virtue of
the spoilation doctrine and the possibility of a suit on the underlying
obligation. This early trend toward easing the harshness of the English
rule would continue under the N.I.L., with mixed results.
V.

THE FIRST CODIFICATION: THE NEGOTIABLE
INSTRUMENTS LAW

In 1895, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws instructed a committee to prepare a draft of a statute to make
uniform the law of negotiable instruments. 124 The Committee, following
closely the English Bills of Exchange Act enacted by Parliament in 1882,
prepared a statute that was adopted by the National Conference in 1896
as the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law. 125 By 1924, the legislature
26
of every state had adopted the act.'
The provision of this law which was to be the ancestor of U.C.C.
subsections 3-407(2) and 3-407(3) was section 124:
Section 124. Alteration of Instrument; effect of.
Where a negotiable instrument is materially altered without the assent
of all parties liable thereon, it is avoided except as against a party who
has himself made, authorized or assented to the alteration and subsequent endorsers. But when an instrument has been materially altered
and is in the hands of a holder in due course, not a party to the alteration, he may enforce payment thereof according to its original
tenor. 127

Section 124 affected the American common law rule in three ways.
First, it introduced the holder in due course concept into the law of alter124. F. BEUTEL, BEUTEL'S BRANNAN NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAw 74 (7th ed. 1948);
McKeehan, The Negotiable Instruments Law (A Review of the Ames-Brewster Controversy), 50 AM.
LAW REG. O.S. 437, 438 (1st paper 1902).
125. See F. BEUTEL, supra note 124, at 74; J. BRADY, THE NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS ACT iv
(1932); McKeehan, supra note 124, at 439.
126. See J. BRADY, supra note 125, at iv.
127. The official comments of the Uniform Commercial Code cite section 124, as well as sections
14, 15 and 125, as the prior uniform statutory provisions. Although sections 14, 15 and 125 are
certainly also ancestors of subsections 3-407(1), (2) and (3), they are not relevant to the topic of this
article.
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ation, thus eliminating many of the ill effects of the windfall discharge.
Second, it eliminated the doctrine of spoilation. Finally, it codified the
strict common law rule which allowed a material but innocent alteration
to discharge the obligor.
Certainly the most evident of the three changes brought about by
adoption of N.I.L. section 124 was the first, that the discharge resulting
from the alteration became a real defense only as to the altered
amount.128 No longer was discharge a real defense as to the original
amount as it was under the common law. Section 124 made this change
by providing that a holder in due course could enforce a materially al1 29
tered instrument according to its original tenor.
This change in the common law represented a major break between
the rule on alteration and the theory and policy which supported the rule
from the beginning. The theory that the identity of the instrument was
destroyed and thus could not be enforced was largely abrogated, because
the holder in due course could now enforce the instrument for its original
tenor despite the alteration. The policy, to prevent and punish tampering, was severely weakened by affording the holder in due course the
right to enforce the instrument's original tenor. Indeed, the introduction
of holder in due course status changed the rule drastically from the time
when an alteration was considered a "criminal forgery" 130 and the
holder, whether a bona fide purchaser or not, suffered a complete loss.
A second way in which N.I.L. section 124 affected the American
common law rule on alteration is that it apparently did away with the
spoilation doctrine. As stated earlier, England had never adopted the
spoilation doctrine in its common law; 13 1 nor was this American doctrine
included in the English Bills of Exchange Act in 1882.132 When the National Conference Committee began to draft a provision on alteration for
128. Ames, The Negotiable Instruments Law, 14 HARV. L. REV. 241, 243 (1900). Dean Ames,
who was highly critical of the Negotiable Instruments Law, called this change one of the "judicious
changes for the better." See also W. BRITrON, supra note 82, § 285, at 1078; W. MOORE & H.
WILKIE, supra note 84, § 105, at 322.
129. The English Bills of Exchange Act had made a similar change in the English common law
rule; indeed, the Commissioners who drafted the N.I.L. quoted in their notes the following portion
of section 64(1) of the English Act to suggest the similarity and to point out the change in the

American rule:
[W]here a bill has been materially altered but the alteration is not apparent and the bill is in
the hands of a holder in due course, such holder may avail himself of the bill as if it had not
been altered and may enforce payment of it according to its original tenor.
The Bills of Exchange Act, 1882, 45 & 46 Vict., ch. 61, § 64(1). The Commissioners' notes, including an explanation of how they were compiled, may be found in F. BEUTEL, supra note 124, at 110,
177.

130.
note 84,
131.
132.

Gettysburg v. Chisholm, 169 Pa. 564, 568, 32 A. 730, 730 (1895); 1 1. EDWARDS, supra
at 191; 2 T. PARSONS, supra note 63, at 583.
See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
The remaining portion of § 64(1) of the English Bills of Exchange Act not quoted in note

129 supra is as follows: "Where a bill or acceptance is materially altered without the assent of all

parties liable on the bill, the bill is avoided except as against a party who has himself made, authorized or assented to the alteration, and subsequent indorsers." The Bills of Exchange Act, 1882, 45 &
46 Vict., ch. 61, § 64(1).
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the N.I.L., it relied very heavily on section 64 of the English Bills of
33
Exchange Act and did away with the American doctrine of spoilation.1
Although some courts continued applying the American doctrine of
spoilation even after adoption of the N.I.L., 134 most authorities agreed
that N.I.L. section 124 abrogated the doctrine and substituted the Eng135
lish rule.
Of the three ways in which the common law rule on alteration was
changed by the N.I.L., loss of the spoilation doctrine perhaps caused the
most complaints. Harvard Law School's Dean James Bar Ames, critiquing the N.I.L., 136 quoted Justice Story's famous criticism of the old English rule:
A doctrine (i.e., the English rule allowing a stranger to bring about a
discharge on an altered instrument) so repugnant to common sense
and justice, which inflicts on an innocent party all the losses occasioned by mistake, by accident, by the wrongful acts of third persons,
or by the providence of Heaven ought to have the unequivocable support of unbroken authority, before a court of law is bound to surrender
its judgment
to what deserves no better name than a technical
37
quibble. 1
Dean Ames recommended that section 124 "should be amended by adding after the word 'altered' in the first line the words 'by the holder,' "
in order to reinstate the American doctrine of spoilation. 138 Others also
suggested the same change. 1 39 Dean Ames' proposed amendment, however, was never made. 14°
Unlike the introduction of the holder in due course concept, abolition of the doctrine of spoilation by the N.I.L. contributed to the harsh
results called for by the theory and policy of the common law rule. It
naturally enlarged the pool of persons who could make an alteration that
would discharge a party on the instrument, thus increasing the likelihood
of a windfall discharge.
133. Ames, The Negotiable Instruments Law-Necessary Amendments, 16 HARv. L. REV. 255,
260 (1903). The abrogation of the American doctrine of spoilation was apparently not inadvertent,
but an attempt to make uniform the laws of England and the United States. J. BRANNAN, THE
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW ANNOTATED 218 (2d ed. 1911); Farrell, The Negotiable Instruments Law: An Answer to Dean Ames's Latest Criticisms, 5 THE BRIEF 15 (1904); McKeehan, The
Negotiable Instruments Law (A Review of the Ames-Brewster Controversy), 50 AM. LAW REG. O.S.
561, 582 (3d paper 1902).
134. See, e.g., Jeffrey v. Rosenfeld, 179 Mass. 506, 61 N.E. 49 (1901); see also W. BRITTON,
supra note 82, § 280, at 1061 (collected cases); W. MOORE & H. WILKIE, supra note 84, § 105, at
318 n.6 (collected cases).
135. F. BEUTEL, supra note 124, at 1197; W. BRITTON, supra note 82, § 280, at 1061; W.
MOORE & H. WILKIE, supra note 84, § 105, at 318 n.6; McKeehan, supra note 133, at 581.
136. Ames, supra note 133.
137. United States v. Spalding, 27 F. Cas. 1278, 1279 (C.C.R.I. 1822) (No. 16,365).
138. Ames, supra note 133, at 261.
139. See Mack, Some Suggestions on the Proposalto Enact the "Uniform Negotiable Instruments
Law" in Illinois, 1 Nw. U.L. REV. 592, 605 (1907); Turner, Revision of the Negotiable Instruments
Law, 38 YALE L.J. 25, 51 (1928); Vernier, Amendments to the Negotiable Instruments Law, 24 ILL.
L. REV. 150, 166 (1929).
140. Three states that adopted the N.I.L., Illinois, South Dakota, and West Virginia, nevertheless retained the spoilation doctrine by altering section 124. F. BEUTEL, supra note 124, at 177.
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A third way in which N.I.L. section 124 affected the prior law was
that it codified the strict common law rule that provided for discharge
when a negotiable instrument was materially altered.141 Like the strict
common law rule, section 124 made no distinction as to whether the alteration was fraudulently or innocently made; any material alteration
under the N.I.L. discharged all parties who had not assented to the
change. 142
Codification of the strict common law rule, of course, changed the
law in those states that had previously allowed a discharge only when the
alteration was both material and fraudulent. 143 After passage of the
N.I.L., no recovery on the altered instrument could be maintained, since
section 124 clearly provided that the instrument was avoided upon any
material alteration. Nevertheless, these states could choose to follow
other states that, under pre-N.I.L. law, had barred a suit on a materially
altered instrument but allowed the holder to recover on the underlying
obligation when the alteration was innocent and not fraudulent 144 and
the parties had dealt with each other in the transaction. Under the
N.I.L. as well as the common law rule, if the alteration was both fraudulent and material, no court would allow a holder to recover on either the
instrument or the underlying obligation. 145
This codification of the strict common law rule caused some complaints. Dean Ames, for example, in his criticism of section 124 stated,
"[I]t would be advisable also to insert before 'materially' in the first line
the words 'fraudulently and.'-"146 Others echoed his criticism. 147 No
148
such amendment, however, was made.
Section 124's codification of the strict common law rule, like the
abolition of the spoilation doctrine, contributed to the harsh results
called for by the theory and policy of the common law rule. By requiring
that an alteration be merely material as a condition of discharge, it increased the likelihood that a windfall discharge might result. For the
same reason discussed earlier, the possibility of a suit on the underlying
obligation did little to help an endorsee of an instrument, although it
certainly may have proved valuable to a payee.
The three changes that the N.I.L. made to the American common
law rule on alteration caused that rule to move in opposite directions at
the same time. The introduction of the holder in due course concept
141. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
142. See supra text accompanying notes 105-06.
143. F. BEUTEL, supra note 124, at 1198; W. BRITrON, supra note 82, § 286, at 1082; Note,
supra note 101, at 58.
144. See supra note 143.
145. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
146. Ames, supra note 133, at 261.

147. See supra note 139.
148. Illinois, however, adopted its version of section 124 with the words "fraudulent or." F.
BEUTEL, supra note 124, at 177.
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moved the rule away from the theory and policy which had called for the
harsh treatment of a holder, and it certainly decreased the possibility of a
windfall discharge. The abolition of the spoilation doctrine and the codification of the strict common law rule, however, squarely supported the
original theory and policy (at least when no holder in due course was
involved) and certainly increased the possibility of a windfall discharge.
VI.

THE SECOND CODIFICATION: THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE

In 1951, the American Law Institute and the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws promulgated the first official
text of the Uniform Commercial Code. 149 Section 3-407 of the U.C.C.
stated the modem rule on alteration.
Of the three ways in which the N.I.L.'s section 124 affected the
common law rule, only one was incorporated into the U.C.C.: the introduction of the holder in due course concept to the rule on alteration,
which, as noted previously, undermined the theory and policy of the
common law rule and made a windfall discharge less likely. The remaining two changes, the abolition of the spoilation doctrine and the codification of the strict common law rule, both of which reinforced the theory
and policy of the common law rule, were erased by section 3-407 of the
U.C.C.
The U.C.C. retained the rule of the N.I.L. that alteration was a real
defense only as to the altered amount. Under the U.C.C., a holder in due
course could thus enforce an altered instrument for its original tenor. 150
This rule eliminated most of the ill effects of section 3-407(2)(a)'s discharge provision. Only those non-holders in due course who could not
gain holder in due course protection under the shelter provision risked
facing the windfall discharge.
The U.C.C. did, however, restore the spoilation doctrine by adding
the phrase "by the holder," as suggested by Dean Ames and others in
criticism of the N.I.L.'s abolition of the doctrine. Official comment 3 to
section 3-407 states that subsection (2) modifies the rigorous rule of
N.I.L. section 124 by providing that a material alteration does not discharge any party unless it is made by the holder. 51' It specifically states,
"Spoilation by any meddling stranger does not affect the rights of the
holder."' 52 Thus, the old American doctrine of spoilation, abandoned by
the N.I.L., was revived under the U.C.C. in the manner suggested some
149. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 17, at 1; Schnader, A Short History of the Preparationand
Enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code, 22 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1 (1967).
150. U.C.C. § 3-407(3) (1977) and introductory clause of § 3-407(2).
151. U.C.C. § 3-407 comment 3(a) (1977).
152. Id.
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four decades earlier. 153
By reintroducing the spoilation doctrine, the U.C.C. took away the
support the N.I.L. had given to the theory and policy of the common law
rule by adopting its abolition. The U.C.C., by reviving the doctrine, reduced the pool of parties who could bring about a discharge, thus making
a windfall discharge even less likely and giving little support for the old
theory and policy, which called for discharge.
The only other change made in the N.I.L. by the U.C.C. was a
change that was first suggested by Dean Ames1 54 and then echoed by
others.1 55 Section 3-407(2)(a) added the words "both fraudulent" so that
an alteration under the U.C.C. had to be both fraudulent and material in
order to bring about a discharge. 56 Although some state courts had
read "fraudulent" into the common law rule prior to adoption of the
N.I.L., both the strict common law rule and the N.I.L. required only
57
that an alteration be material before it yielded a discharge.
By requiring that an alteration must be fraudulent as well as material before a discharge will occur, the U.C.C. again widened the gap between the rule on alteration and the theory and policy that supported the
original rule. The requirement of a fraudulent alteration, like the
N.I.L.'s introduction of holder in due course status and the U.C.C.'s
reintroduction of the spoilation doctrine, expanded the holder's opportunity to sue on an altered instrument. Under the strict common law rule,
a bona fide purchaser for value could not sue at all on a materially altered instrument, and under the N.I.L., a non-holder in due course could
not sue at all on a materially altered instrument. In contrast, under the
U.C.C., even a non-holder in due course can sue on a materially altered
instrument as long as it is not fraudulently altered. Since a holder's
chance of suing on an altered instrument under the U.C.C. is thus increased, the likelihood of a windfall discharge is accordingly decreased.
The U.C.C. thus retained that part of the N.I.L. under which the
rule of alteration shifted away from the theory and policy underlying the
original rule: the holder in due course concept. It changed those aspects
of the N.I.L. which followed from the original theory and policy: abolition of the spoilation doctrine and codification of the strict common law
rule. The net effect of the U.C.C. was to separate, more completely than
ever before, the modem rule on alteration from the theory and policy
that supported the old common law rule. The possibility of discharge,
windfall or otherwise, was less likely under the U.C.C. than it had ever
been before.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

See supra text accompanying note 136.
Ames, supra note 133, at 261.
See supra note 139.
U.C.C. § 3-407 comments 3(b), (d) (1977).
See supra notes 104 & 141 and accompanying text.
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VII.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF U.C.C. SECTION

3-407

The drafting history of section 3-407 has been decidedly unexciting.
Since the official text of the U.C.C. was promulgated in 1951, there have
5
been no changes to sections 3-407 and no state variations.' 8
The New York Law Revision Commission studied Article 3 and
section 3-407 during its examination of the U.C.C. from 1953 through
1956.159 Despite the criticism leveled at the U.C.C., and the New York
Law Revision Commission's final recommendation that it should not be
enacted in New York without revision, section 3-407 came out not only
60
unscathed but almost unmentioned.1
The law firm of Milbank, Tweek, Hoke and Hadley, attorneys for
the Chase National Bank of the City of New York, studied Article 3 and
concluded that it should not replace the N.I.L. 16 1 In its memorandum,
filed with the New York Law Revision Commission, section 3-407 was
not mentioned. 162 In reply, Professor Arthur E. Sutherland of Harvard
Law School, Chairman of the Committee on Article 3, wrote that he
assumed the sections not expressly criticized in the law firm's memorandum were unobjectionable. 63 He therefore made no attempt to defend
section 3-407. Nor did Professor Soia Mentschikoff, in her reply to the
law firm's memorandum, mention section 3-407, apparently for the same
64
reason.'
The first analysis of section 3-407, prepared under the direction of
the Law Revision Commission, soon followed. Professor Bertram F.
Willcox of Cornell University Law School examined section 3-407 in relation to the present New York law.' 65 He suggested that 3-407(2)(a)'s
rule, that an alteration does not result in discharge unless made "by the
holder," worked no change in New York. He reported that New York
had apparently continued to apply its old common law rule, including
the doctrine of spoilation, 66 even though limiting words like "by the
holder" were lacking in New York's version of N.I.L. section 124.167 He
68
noted that U.C.C. section 3-407(2)(a) had added those limiting words.1
158. 6 W. WILLIER, F. HART & R. DISIDERIO, U.C.C. REP.-DIG. 1-636.51 (1981).
159. The New York Law Revision Commission Reports provide the "richest single source of
'legislative history' on the code." R. BRAUCHER & R. RIEGERT, INTRODUCTION TO COMMERCIAL
TRANSACTIONS 28 (1972). For a short summary of the work of the New York Law Revision Commission, see David G. Epstein's Introduction in 1 Commission Report (1954).
160. The Commission's study and recommendations can be found in 1-2 Commission Report
(1954), 1-3 Commission Report (1955) and 1 Commission Report (1956).
161. 1 Commission Report 199 (1954).
162. See id. at 208.
163. Id. at 240.
164. Id. at 255.
165. 2 Commission Report 1013 (1955).
166. New York was one of several jurisdictions that continued to apply the spoilation doctrine
even after adoption of the N.I.L. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
167. 2 Commission Report 1015 (1955).
168. Id.
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Willcox pointed out that section 3-407(2)(b) would, however, change
prior New York law since a non-fraudulent material alteration would no
1 69
longer trigger a discharge.
In 1956, when the New York Law Revision Commission recommended changes in the 1952 official text, no changes to section 3-407
were suggested. Although the Commission recommended changes for
many other sections, section 3-407 generated the simple comment, "This
1 70
section was approved."
The drafting history of the U.C.C. ordinarily begins with the 1952
official text of the Code, because prior drafts were not approved by the
American Law Institute of the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws.1 71 Nevertheless, an examination of prior drafts
beginning in 1949, when the first integrated draft of the Code appeared,
sometimes helps in the interpretation of the final revisions of the Code.' 72
In the case of section 3-407, however, an examination of prior drafts reflects only the lack of controversy over the section, already shown by
post-1952 legislative history.
In the May 1949 draft of the Code, the text of what was to become
section 3-407 differed only slightly from what it is today.1 73 The words
"by the holder" appeared in the 1949 draft and were never revised. By
the time the Spring 1951 text edition 1 74 and the November 1951 final text
edition 17 5 appeared, the language was exactly as it was to appear in the
1952 official text.
Perhaps the lack of controversy over section 3-407 and the resulting
lack of information to be gleaned from its legislative history may be ex169. Id.
170. 1 Commission Report 409 (1956).
171. See 6 W. WILLIER, F. HART & R. DISIDERIO, supra note 158, at 1-3.
172. This approach may not be a valid tool for interpreting U.C.C. provisions. Section
I-103(3)(g) of the 1952 edition of the Code provided that "[p]rior drafts of texts and comments may
not be used to ascertain legislative intent." The explanation for this provision was that "[fQrequently
matters have been omitted as being implicit without statement and language has been changed or
added solely for clarity. The only safe guide to intent lies in the final text and comments." U.C.C.
§ I-103(3)(g) comment (1952). Section I-103(3)(g), however, was deleted in the 1957 edition of the
Code at the suggestion of the New York Law Revision Commission. The stated reason for the
deletion was that changes to the 1952 edition were clearly legitimate history. This reasoning may or
may not suggest that pre-1952 history may be used to determine intent. White and Summers list
prior drafts as an aid to interpretation and construction of the Code, but warn that "lawyers cannot
base reliable inferences as to intended meaning of enacted text on changes made from prior versions
of that text." WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 17, at 11.
173. U.C.C. § 3-406 (1949). Subsection (2)(a) of the 1949 draft differs from the modern version
by including the word "otherwise" as follows: "[A]lteration by the holder which is both fraudulent
and material discharges any party whose contract is thereby changed unless that party assents or is
otherwise precluded from asserting the defense." Id. Subsection (3) of the 1949 draft differs from the
modern version by including "before he takes" as follows: "A subsequent holder in due course may
in all cases enforce the instrument according to its original tenor, and when an incomplete instrument has been completed before he takes, he may enforce it as completed." Id. This 1949 draft was
published for study purposes and was not recommended for adoption by the states. 6 W. WILLIER,
F. HART & R. DISIDERIO, supra note 158, at 1-3.

174. U.C.C. § 3-407 (Spring 1951).
175. U.C.C. § 3-407 (November 1951).
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plained by the fact that section 3-407 actually received its closest scrutiny
some four decades before the first integrated draft of the U.C.C. appeared
in 1949. This occurred during the famous Ames-Brewster controversy 76
which included N.I.L. section 124, the ancestor of U.C.C. section 3-407.
As noted previously, N.I.L. section 124 was praised in that controversy
for its incorporation of the holder in due course concept into the rule on
alteration, but it came under fire by Dean Ames and others because of its
apparent abolition of the doctrine of spoilation and its failure to require
that the alteration be fraudulent as well as material.1 77 The drafters of
the U.C.C. retained in new section 3-407 the holder in due course concept, and included "by the holder" and "and fraudulently" just as Ames
had proposed in order to remedy his criticism of section 124. Hence, the
articles documenting the Ames-Brewster controversy should be considered as valid legislative history for section 3-407. 178
The Ames-Brewster controversy clearly suggests the significance of
the phrase, "by the holder," in subsection (2)(a): it revived the spoilation
doctrine, which had been dropped by the N.I.L. drafters in reliance on
the English Bill of Exchange Act. Dean Ames proposed this exact
phrase to restore the spoilation doctrine, and the drafters of the U.C.C.,
relying on the Ames-Brewster controversy as legislative history, apparently incorporated both Ames' suggestion and its rationale. Thus, based
on this legislative history, the phrase does not answer the interpretive
problem raised by Professor Steinheimer when he asked, "Does this expression refer to any holder of the instrument or only to the holder at the
time claim is made and the defense asserted?"'179 The phrase was intended only to make it definite, as official comment 3a clearly confirms in
light of this legislative history,1 80 that the spoilation doctrine was back,
this time to stay.

VIII. A U.C.C.

CASE

No appellate case decided under the U.C.C. has yet resulted in a
windfall discharge. Although cases involving altered instruments still
frequently reach the appellate level as they did under the common law
and the N.I.L., an alteration under the U.C.C. is usually found to be
either immaterial, not fraudulent, or perhaps not made by the holder, so
176. The articles by Ames and Brewster which make up the celebrated controversy are as follows: Ames, The NegotiableInstruments Law, 14 HARV. L. REV. 241 (1900); Ames, The Negotiable
Instruments Law. A Word More, 14 HARV. L. REV. 442 (1901); Ames, The Negotiable Instruments
Law-Necessary Amendments, 16 HARV. L. REV. 255 (1903); Brewster, The Negotiable Instruments
Law-A Rejoinder to Dean Ames, 15 HARV. L. REV. 26 (1901); Brewster, A Defense of the Negotiable Instruments Law, 10 YALE L.J. 84 (1901); see also McKeehan, The Negotiable Instruments Law
(A Review of the Ames-Brewster Controversy), 50 AM. LAW REG. O.S. 437, 499, 561 (1902).

177.
178.
179.
180.

See supra note 128 and text accompanying notes 136 & 146.
See supra note 51.
See supra note 10.
U.C.C. § 3-407 comment 3(a) (1977).
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that even a non-holder in due course may enforce the instrument for the
original tenor despite the alteration. 8" Without a discharge, of course,
no windfall discharge can result.
One lower court U.C.C. decision, however, includes all the elements
of the classic windfall discharge case. In First Pennsylvania Bank &
Trust Co. v. Kritzberger,182 a representative of Greater Premiums Food
81 3
Company, Inc. (Company) persuaded the defendants to sign a note
payable to the Company in return for the immediate delivery of a food
freezer and future deliveries of food. Since neither of the parties was sure
of the cost of the food at the time, the spaces in the note for the amount
were not filled in. The Company, however, later completed those blanks
with an amount much larger than the defendants had told the representative they would be able to pay. The Company then negotiated the note to
the First Pennsylvania Bank & Trust Co. (Bank). When the Bank informed the defendants of the installment amounts due, they responded
that they had never given authority for an amount that large and refused
to pay. The Bank sued. Since the note contained a confession of judgment clause, the Bank easily obtained a judgment against the defendants,
who then petitioned to reopen the case to consider their defense.
The court first established that fraud was apparently perpetrated on
the defendants, justifying the opening of the judgment and the submission of the issues to the jury. In addition, it found a second reason for
opening the judgment. Citing U.C.C. section 3-407, the court held that
the Company's completion of the blanks with an amount greater than
that authorized was a material alteration, and that the alteration had
been made fraudulently. Furthermore, since the Bank under section 3407(3) and section 3-307(3) had not established it was a holder in due
course, the court held that the Bank took the note subject to the defendant's defense, a discharge under section 3-407(2)(a). Therefore, since the
court found that the defendants had a meritorious defense, the court ordered the judgment reopened.
With the case reopened, the Bank had the opportunity to establish it
was a holder in due course. If it could, it would take free of the defense
of discharge and could enforce the instrument against the defendants for
the completed amount. If not, however, a windfall discharge would have
occurred, with the defendants in possession of the food freezer and perhaps several months' worth of food, and the Bank unable to assert the
181. See Annot., 88 A.L.R. 3D 905 (1978)(collected cases).
182. 13 Bucks Co. L.R. 321, 32 Pa. D. & C.2d 610 (1963).
183. The opinion is confusing as to whether the signed writing was a negotiable promissory note
under U.C.C. § 3-104(1) and (2)(d) or whether it was a non-negotiable installment sales contract.
The opinion initially refers to the writing as a note but later shifts to the term "installment sales
contract." It refers to § 3-407 without deciding whether the writing was a negotiable instrument,
but also refers to U.C.C. § 9-206(1) as if the writing were not a negotiable instrument. 32 Pa. D. &
C.2d at 620, 623.
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note against the defendants for any amount.18 4
In all likelihood, the Bank would have been able to prove holder in
due course status in this case. After all, the Owens case1 85 was not yet
available to support any judicial consumer protection, and the F.T.C.
regulations, which might also have applied, were over a decade and a half
yet in the future. If this case had arisen later, either Owens or the F.T.C.
regulations might well have applied to bring about the windfall discharge
by denying holder in due course status to the Bank. Certainly all the
elements for a windfall discharge were present.
IX.

ABOLITION OF HOLDER IN DUE COURSE STATUS UNDER THE

F.T.C.

REGULATIONS AND THE PROPOSED UNIFORM NEW
PAYMENTS CODE

As noted earlier, t8 6 the Federal Trade Commission's regulations
create a large class of noteholders who cannot be holders in due course.
If one cannot be a holder in due course of notes so affected by the F.T.C.
regulations, no subsequent holder can obtain holder in due course status
under the shelter provision of U.C.C. section 3-201(1). Therefore, a
holder of such a note will never be able to seek the protection of section
3-407(3) for the holder in due course when a previous holder makes a
material and fraudulent alteration. As a result, the F.T.C. regulations
may potentially bring about windfall discharges as frequently as did the
English common law rule, under which alteration was a real defense even
as to the original tenor. Indeed, under the F.T.C. regulations, a material
and fraudulent alteration by the holder (assuming the standard interpretation) becomes in effect again a real defense, as it was under the English
common law rule, since it can be asserted against any noteholder (assuming the F.T.C. regulations apply) under section 3-407(2)(a) to cause a
187
complete discharge of a maker.

The effect of the proposed Uniform New Payments Code

88

184. Of course, the Bank could proceed against Greater Premium Food Company, Inc., unless it
took the note without recourse. Although the typical response of the fraudulent alterer might be to
run for places unknown or to become suddenly judgment proof, the facts indicate that the Company
was probably still available for suit. The Company's representative, who persuaded the defendants
to sign the note, probably vanished like the typical fraudulent alterer.
185. Unico v. Owens, 50 N.J. 101, 232 A.2d 405 (1967).
186. See supra text accompanying notes 28-30.
187. Section 3-407(2)(a)'s discharge provision may not apply to a note which complies with
F.T.C. regulations. Although confusion exists as to why the F.T.C. language has the particular
effect it has, see supra note 30, the theory that the language makes payment of the note conditional
under § 3-104(1)(b) and thus non-negotiable pushes the note that complies with F.T.C. regulations
outside the U.C.C. and § 3-407(2)(a)'s discharge provisions. See 4 W. HAWKLAND & L. LAWRENCE, supra note 30, § 3-302:09, at 386; WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 17, at 1138. Even if the
note complying with F.T.C. regulations thus becomes a simple contract, its assignee faces similar
discharge consequences under contract law rules on alterations. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 286 (1981).
188. All references to sections of the Uniform New Payments Code (U.N.P.C.) are to Permanent
Editorial Board Draft No. 3, June 2, 1983. This draft, of course, has never been promulgated or
approved by the "3-4-8" Committee or the Permanent Editorial Board.
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(U.N.P.C.) on holder in due course status as to a consumer check18 9 is
less well known than that of the F.T.C. regulations as to certain notes.
As stated earlier, 1 90 the "3-4-8" Committee, in drafting the U.N.P.C.,
considered abolition of holder in due course status for transferees of consumer checks.1 91
As worded in Permanent Editorial Board Draft No. 3, the U.N.P.C.
applied only to "any orders payable by or at, or transmitted by or to an
account institution."1 92 Thus, all checks and many drafts were within
the scope of the U.N.P.C.; to that extent, they were excluded from the
scope of article 3 of the U.C.C. 193 Promissory notes and any drafts not
within the scope of the U.N.P.C. remained subject to article 3 of the
U.C.C.194
Since U.C.C. section 3-407's provisions on alteration would no
longer apply to checks and drafts within the scope of the U.N.P.C., a
new provision for alteration had to be included in the new code. Thus,
section 156 of the U.N.P.C. provided that "[a] funds claimant who has
fraudulently and materially altered an order discharges the obligation of
any party on the order whose contract is changed unless the party assents
to the alteration or is precluded from asserting the discharge defense." 195
As suggested in its accompanying comment, this section follows
U.C.C. section 3-407(2)(a). One difference, however, is quite noticeable.
Although the term "funds claimant"' 196 in section 156 is the counterpart
of "holder" under the U.C.C., 19 7 the U.N.P.C. introduces "funds claimant" with the article "a" rather than "the," which precedes "holder" in
U.C.C. section 3-407(2)(a). This change in the U.N.P.C. supports the
standard interpretation that "the" means "a" in U.C.C. section 3407(2)(a).
U.N.P.C. section 156 gives the drawer a complete discharge when a
material and fraudulent alteration is made by a "funds claimant." Section 103(3) of the U.N.P.C. prevents a funds claimant from gaining due
189. The U.N.P.C. does not use the term "consumer check," but rather refers to the check of the
"consumer drawer," which is not subject to due course rights under U.N.P.C. § 103(3). U.N.P.C.
§ 52(1) defines a consumer drawer as "an individual who is authorized to initiate orders against a
consumer account." U.N.P.C. § 50(12) defines a consumer account as an "account established with
an account institution in the name of one or more individuals, unless such individuals have represented in writing to the account institution that the account is not to be used primarily for personal,
family or household purposes."
190. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
191. Benfield, supra note 31, at 12; Brandel & Soloway, supra note 16, at 1363; H. Scott, Memorandum to National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 16 (June 15, 1983);
U.N.P.C. § 103(3). Comment 3 to U.N.P.C. § 103 explores the justification for the abolition of
holder in due course status for the transferee of a consumer check.

192. U.N.P.C. § 2. Section 53(l) defines an account institution as "any person which in the
ordinary course of its business maintains accounts for its customers."
193. U.N.P.C. § 2 & comment; H. Scott, supra note 191, at 4.
194. U.N.P.C. § 2 & comment; H. Scott, supra note 191, at 4.

195. U.N.P.C. § 156.
196. "Funds claimant" is defined in U.N.P.C. § 52(11).
197. See H. Scott, supra note 191, at 9.
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course rights on a consumer check even if he has taken for value, in good
faith, and without notice. 198 Since a funds claimant without due course
rights takes subject to all claims and defenses, 199 a discharge acquired by
the drawer under section 156 as a result of alteration may therefore be
asserted against the funds claimant. Thus, a funds claimant (i.e., a
holder) of a check written on a consumer account cannot take free of the
defense of discharge acquired by a drawer under section 156.
Like the F.T.C. regulations, the U.N.P.C. would create a large class
of check holders who cannot acquire due course rights, or, in U.C.C.
terms, holder in due course status. In addition, as with the consumer
note under the F.T.C. regulations, if a funds claimant cannot acquire due
course rights on a consumer check under the U.N.P.C., a subsequent
funds claimant cannot acquire due course rights from a prior transferor
under U.N.P.C. section 106, the equivalent of the U.C.C.'s shelter provision. Therefore, under the U.N.P.C., a funds claimant on a consumer
check will never be able to acquire due course rights in order to take free
of a material and fraudulent alteration by a prior funds claimant. As a
result, the U.N.P.C. has the potential of bringing about windfall discharges as frequently as did the English common law rule, under which
alteration was a real defense even as to the original tenor. Indeed, just as
under the F.T.C. regulations, a material and fraudulent alteration by a
funds claimant under U.N.P.C. section 156 is a real defense, as it was
under the old English common law rule, since it can be asserted against
any funds claimant on a consumer check to bring about a complete discharge of the drawer.
The proposed abolition of holder in due course status for consumer
checks, however, did not survive its draft form. Beginning in November
of 1983, the "3-4-8" Committee, the Permanent Editorial Board, and the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, together
with the American Law Institute, decided to eliminate the special consumer provisions in any future draft, thus excluding the limitation on due
0
course rights under U.N.P.C. section 103.2 0
Although the special consumer provisions of the U.N.P.C. were
eliminated, the idea of abolishing holder in due course status as to a consumer check has been seriously considered. Strong policy arguments
have been made and published in its support, 20 1 and it has received at
198.

U.N.P.C. § 104(1) generally allows a funds claimant to acquire due course rights if he takes

for value, in good faith, and without notice. A funds claimant with due course rights, just as a
holder in due course under the U.C.C., ordinarily takes free of claims and most defenses under
U.N.P.C. § 104(4).
199. U.N.P.C. § 103(3).
200. Miller, Report on the New Payments Code, 41 Bus. LAW. 1007 (1986); Miller, A Report on
the New Payments Code, 39 Bus. LAW. 1215 (1984).
201. U.N.P.C. § 103 comment 3.
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least some favorable comment. 20 2 Although the day may not yet have
arrived for abolition of holder in due course status as to a consumer
check, it may not be far in the future.
If holder in due course status were ever abolished as to the holder of
a consumer check as proposed under the U.N.P.C., the potential for
windfall discharge would increase exponentially, considering the tremendous number of checks in circulation. In net effect, the rule on alteration
for some notes and many checks would be altered to its original form
prior to the codification of the N.I.L. and the introduction of holder in
due course status, a change probably not contemplated by the F.T.C. or
the "3-4-8" Committee.
IX.

CONCLUSION

Who is the section 3-407(2)(a) holder who, by his material and
fraudulent alteration of a negotiable instrument, will discharge a drawer,
maker or other party on the instrument at the expense of a subsequent
holder? Is he "the"holder at the time the claim is made and the defense
asserted, or is he just "a" holder who previously held the instrument?
Section 3-407(2)(a) does not, by itself, answer that question.
To be sure, legal writers in the past have attempted to interpret the
phrase "by the holder" in section 3-407(2)(a) so as to answer this question, but the results have always been unsatisfactory. The apparent reason is that the phrase "by the holder" was never intended to answer that
question. The history of the spoilation doctrine yields the conclusion
that the wording of the phrase "by the holder" in U.C.C. section 3407(2)(a) was specifically intended to reinstate the spoilation doctrine.
The phrase "by the holder" was never intended to answer questions
other than those concerning the spoilation doctrine. Thus, it is unfair to
criticize the standard interpretation simply because it forces one to read
"the holder" as "a holder," contrary to the express language of section 3407(2)(a). The drafters deliberately used the words "the holder," but
only to revive the spoilation doctrine and not to resolve whether only
"the holder," as opposed to "a holder," may generate a discharge by
altering an instrument.
If the phrase "by the holder" does not determine the holder that will
bring about a discharge under section 3-407(2)(a), how can that question
be answered? The only source that has ever resolved the question is the
common law rule that first took root in England and then was transplanted to America. Early case law in England and America shows that
"a" holder (i.e., any holder) who altered an instrument could in fact discharge a party on the instrument so that even a subsequent holder could
202. See Benfield, supra note 31, at 39.
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not enforce it. No case indicates that only "the" holder at the time the
claim is made and the defense asserted could bring about a discharge.
Indeed, the holder in due course concept was apparently introduced by
the N.I.L. specifically to ameliorate some of the ill effects which "a"
holder could cause a subsequent party.
The common law rule thus supports the standard interpretation
since both would allow "a" holder to bring about a discharge. No evidence exists today to show that the common law rule's intended use of
"a" holder has in any way changed. N.I.L. section 124 certainly has no
language to indicate that "a" holder cannot bring about a discharge. If
the phrase "by the holder" relates, as suggested, only to the spoilation
doctrine, U.C.C. section 3-407 also has no language to indicate that "a"
holder cannot bring about a discharge. Since the U.C.C. is not a comprehensive codification in that its provisions may be supplemented by the
common law, 20 3 the answer to the question of what "holder" can cause a
discharge under section 3-407(2)(a) is "a" holder or any holder, just as
was true under the common law rule. The standard interpretation is
consistent with this conclusion.
The common law rule further suggests that it is unfair to criticize
the standard interpretation merely because it brings about the windfall
discharge. The common law rule also triggered the windfall discharge.
No language in the N.I.L. or the U.C.C. suggests that the windfall discharge has been eliminated, unless the instrument is held by a holder in
due course or one who has the rights of a holder in due course under the
shelter provision of section 3-201(1). Thus, the windfall discharge still
exists to the extent that it has not been abolished by the holder in due
course concept. If the standard interpretation brings about a windfall
discharge, that result is entirely in line with section 3-407(2) as supplemented by the common law rule.
Assuming that the standard interpretation is correct, we must live
with the windfall discharge to the extent that it still exists. Although the
holder in due course concept formerly minimized the frequency of the
windfall discharge, the present effect of the F.T.C. regulations and the
possible future effect of any legislative action similar to the U.N.P.C. indicates that the windfall discharge may once again become common.
The reemergence of the windfall discharge is probably something we
should not welcome. The gap between the modem rule under section 3407 and the theory and policy that supported the strict common law rule
suggests why. The theory and policy expounded in the early common
law cases shaped the strict common law rule and spawned the windfall
203. U.C.C. § 1-103 (1977); see also Lawrence, Misconceptions About Article 3 of the Uniform
Commercial Code: A Suggested Methodology and Proposed Revisions, 62 N.C.L. REV. 115 passim
(1983).
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discharge. The modern rule, however, has been modified over time to
eliminate the harsh results demanded by the common law theory and
policy. Indeed, the trend of the law of alteration over the years has been
to allow a subsequent holder of an altered instrument a much better
chance of successfully suing on that instrument. If the effects of the
F.T.C. regulations and the U.N.P.C. are not considered, alteration is not
nearly as serious as it was under the common law. Indeed, the policy of
the modern rule, if there is one, seems to be that a holder who materially
and fraudulently alters an instrument should be punished, but not at the
expense of a subsequent, innocent holder. If this indeed is the policy
behind the modern rule, it would seem that the windfall discharge, increasingly likely under the F.T.C. regulations and legislation similar to
the U.N.P.C., should be most unwelcome. Instead of punishing just the
holder who fraudulently and materially altered the instrument, many entirely innocent holders will be punished-even those who would qualify
as holders in due course in the absence of the F.T.C. regulations or the
U.N.P.C.
The windfall discharge of section 3-407(2)(a) should be eliminated
to avoid its interference with the apparent policy of the U.C.C. of protecting subsequent innocent holders of an instrument materially and
fraudulently altered by a previous holder. 20 4 Certainly, the abolition of
holder in due course status as to consumer notes and its possible abolition as to consumer checks urge elimination of the windfall discharge.
The windfall discharge may be eliminated either by amendment 20 5
to section 3-407(2)(a)'s discharge provision or by outright abolition of the
discharge by alteration. Eliminating the windfall discharge by amendment may appear more attractive, but it would be more complex and
difficult to draft. Abolition of the discharge seems a rather drastic measure in light of discharge's long history in association with alteration, but
it may be exactly what is needed.
The purpose of amendment could be twofold: (1) to eliminate the
windfall discharge by no longer rewarding the party whose contract has
been altered if he has received value in exchange for the instrument and
(2) to continue to discourage and punish those who tamper with negotiable instruments. Amendment thus presupposes that section 3-407(2)(a)'s
204. As an alternative to elimination, the windfall discharge might be avoided by use of a quasicontract theory, allowing the non-holder in due course, against whom discharge under U.C.C. § 3407(2)(a) could be asserted, to sue the drawer or maker to prevent unjust enrichment. See generally
1 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 19 (1963). This alternative, however, is only a makeshift
solution in light of the uncertainties surrounding whether a court will allow a quasi-contract theory
and whether § 3-4 07(2)(a) may be supplemented by that theory under § 1-103.
205. Amendment, as I use the term, could be anything short of outright abolition of § 3-

407(2)(a)'s discharge provision; the amendment suggested in the text is, I think, midway between
§ 3-407 as it is now and outright abolition.
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discharge provisions will remain, and that only the ill effects of the windfall discharge will be eliminated.
Such an amendment might provide that to the extent a maker or
drawer, otherwise discharged by a fraudulent and material alteration
under section 3-407(2)(a), has received value in exchange for an altered
instrument, his contract should not be discharged as to an innocent, nonaltering holder. Without the requirement that a non-altering holder be a
holder in due course, such an innocent non-holder in due course could,
under the amendment, enforce a fraudulently and materially altered instrument so that no windfall discharge would result. The maker or
drawer would have to pay the amount of the instrument to the non-altering holder to the extent of the value received, and the non-altering holder
could not enforce the contract except to that extent.
Although such an amendment would eliminate the windfall discharge of.section 3-407(2)(a) in the above situation, the discharge provisions would remain in effect in two other situations. The first of these
situations would not result in a windfall discharge. The second would
result in a windfall discharge, but not with the usual ill effect.
The first situation would occur when no value is exchanged for the
instrument. To the extent that the maker or drawer whose contract has
been altered has not received value in exchange for the instrument (for
example, as when a thief steals a bearer instrument from a maker or
drawer and then alters it), not even a non-altering holder should be able
to enforce the contract even as to the original tenor. 20 6 However, the
maker or drawer would not receive a windfall discharge, since no value
was given in exchange for the instrument.
The second situation involves the holder who fraudulently and materially altered the instrument. Whether the maker or drawer whose
contract was altered gave value in exchange for the instrument or not,
the holder who fraudulently and materially altered the instrument should
not be able to enforce the instrument. In this situation, a windfall discharge would still occur to the extent the maker or drawer gave value,
but the windfall would be justified because it punishes only the party who
materially and fraudulently altered the instrument. Of course, if no
value were received by the maker or drawer, a discharge would occur but
without the windfall.
An amendment of section 3-407(2)(a) could thus eliminate the worst
effect of the windfall discharge, but retain enough of the discharge provision to punish those who fraudulently and materially alter negotiable instruments. The key, of course, to such an amendment is that the
innocent, non-altering holder, to enforce the materially and fraudulently
206. The exception is if the non-altering party were a holder in due course, who could then
enforce the contract for the original tenor under § 3-407(3).
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altered instrument, need not be a holder in due course, thus eliminating
the windfall discharge except as to the holder who has materially and
fraudulently altered the instrument. The problem in drafting such an
amendment is describing the non-altering holder who may enforce the
fraudulently and materially altered instrument when value has been
given in exchange. Exactly how much less than a holder in due course he
may be and still be allowed to enforce the instrument presents a real
problem in drafting. Describing the non-alterer as an "innocent" holder
will not be sufficient unless innocence is defined with some certainty.
Surely, if the non-altering holder was in some way involved in the
alteration, and perhaps even if he merely knew of the alteration before he
took the instrument, he should not be allowed to enforce the instrument,
even though he did not actually do the altering. Suppose, however, that
a non-altering holder who was unaware of the alteration just happened to
be a non-holder in due course by reason of some matter unrelated to
alteration, such as receiving notice that a check was overdue under section 3-304(2)(c). That might indeed be one case in which the non-altering holder should be described as "innocent" and permitted to enforce
the materially and fraudulently altered instrument, at least to the extent
of value received by the maker or drawer.
However, if an innocent, non-altering holder may take with notice
of the type specified in section 3-304(2)(c), which is completely unrelated
to alteration, one might conclude that such a holder should be able to
take with notice of other matters, as long as they have nothing to do with
alteration, and still be able to enforce the instrument. That conclusion,
however, would surely be too far-reaching, because under the U.C.C. a
non-holder in due course takes subject to claims and defenses unrelated
to the reason that he is not a holder in due course. 20 7 Further, merely
that an alteration occurred should not give a non-holder in due course
the right to take free of notice of claims and defenses other than those
related to alteration, a right not available to the ordinary non-holder in
due course.
Unfortunately, it is difficult to amend section 3-407(2)(a) to specify
the kinds of claims and defenses of which one might have notice, yet still
be considered "innocent," and hence permitted to enforce a materially
and fraudulently altered instrument. Indeed, except for the situation involving section 3-304(2)(c), it is hard to identify another situation in a
U.C.C. context 20 8 in which a non-altering, non-holder in due course is an
"innocent" party who should be allowed to enforce a materially and
207. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 17, at 568.
208. Outside the U.C.C. context, two such situations might be identified. First, a non-altering
party may not qualify as a holder in due course merely because of F.T.C. language in a consumer
note. Second, under the proposed U.N.P.C., a non-altering party may not have the rights of a holder
in due course merely because of the existence of a consumer check.
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fraudulently altered instrument. Surely, such innocent, non-altering
holders exist in other situations, but allowing notice of some claims or
defenses unrelated to alteration, but not others, quickly leads to unwanted wrinkles in the fabric of the U.C.C.
Part of the problem in drafting an amendment is that section 3407(2)(a) imposes a double penalty on any non-holder in due course who
seeks to enforce an altered instrument. First, the maker or drawer whose
contract has been altered can assert the defense of alteration, to the extent the amount is altered. Second, the maker or drawer whose contract
has been altered can assert discharge of the original amount against the
non-holder in due course, if the instrument has been materially and
fraudulently altered by a holder. Any attempt to draft an amendment
that eliminates part of the double penalty in some situations, but retains
it entirely in others, would perhaps inevitably lead to unwanted wrinkles.
It may indeed be impossible to define exactly when the double penalty
should be present and when it should not, without disturbing the fabric
of the U.C.C.
However, if the second part of the double penalty, the discharge
provision, were eliminated entirely from section 3-407, the windfall discharge and all of its ill effects would be entirely removed, and the fabric
of the U.C.C. would remain undisturbed. In other words, abolishing the
discharge provision of section 3-407(2)(a), rather than amending that
section, may well be the better proposal.
Indeed, although certainly more shocking and drastic, abolishing alteration as a ground for discharge would be a far easier and less complex
proposal. Section 3-407(2) and (3) could simply be eliminated, with the
result that alteration would still be a defense to the extent of the alteration, but the maker or drawer of the instrument would remain liable for
the original amount. Without a doubt, this proposal would abolish the
windfall discharge since any holder, altering or non-altering, holder in
due course or non-holder in due course, would be able to enforce the
instrument according to its original tenor. The defense of alteration
would be effective only as to any altered term.
What is shocking about this proposal is that eliminating discharge of
the maker or drawer whose contract was altered also eliminates punishment of the holder who materially and fraudulently alters an instrument.
This result probably provides the strongest argument against abolition of
the discharge provision. Although the maker or drawer could still assert
alteration as a defense to the extent of the alteration, he would continue
to be liable even to the altering holder for the original tenor. 20 9 Thus, a
209. The altering holder may have technically breached the warranty of no material alteration.
U.C.C. §§ 3-417(1), 4-207(1) (1977). Damages under that warranty, however, would ordinarily be
limited to the extent of the alteration. 4 W. HAWKLAND & L. LAWRENCE, supra note 30,
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holder may no longer be restrained from making a fraudulent alteration
by fear that he later may not enforce the instrument even for the original
tenor.
This result, of course, runs contrary to the policy of the common
law of England, incorporated into the American common law. In the
words of Lord Kenyon in Master v. Miller, "[N]o man shall be permitted
to take the chance of committing a fraud without running any risk of
losing by the event, when it is detected. ' 210 Complete discharge of the
instrument provided a disincentive against alteration under not only the
common law, but also the N.I.L. and the U.C.C.211 Abolition of the discharge provision would, of course, eliminate this ancient disincentive, so
that a party would no longer be punished for a fraudulent alteration.
The fear of discharge as a disincentive for alteration sounds good in
theory, but whether it actually works is another question. One must
surely agree with Professor White that an altering holder will not be deterred by the fact that his actions might discharge a maker or drawer,
2 12
while he negotiates the altered instrument to a third party for value.
In that situation, the innocent third party cannot enforce the instrument
against the maker or drawer, thus setting the stage for a windfall discharge. Whether or not section 3-407(2)(a)'s discharge provision provides a real disincentive in any other situation may be questioned in light
of the large number of reported cases involving alteration; either people
are unaware of the possible discharge resulting from alteration, or they
are quite willing to take the risk. In all fairness, however, it is possible
that without the disincentive of discharge the number of alteration cases
might be even greater. Indeed, without empirical evidence of the effect of
the discharge, we will probably never know whether its purpose has ever
been fulfilled.
Even if one concedes that the discharge provision may indeed provide some disincentive and that its benefits outweigh its harms, it is still
possible to argue that the provision and its potential for causing windfall
discharge could be eliminated without loss of all disincentive to the
fraudulent alterer. The argument assumes that a person who fraudulently alters a negotiable instrument anticipates a criminal penalty, not
the civil penalty of discharge under section 3-407. Indeed, assuming that
altering a check for fraudulent purposes is a crime in all states and triggers sufficient punishment, 2 13 the U.C.C. need not also provide a civil
§ 3-417:10, at 760; 5 W. HAWKLAND, F. LEARY & R. ALDERMAN, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
SERIES § 4-207:10, at 452 (1984).
210. Master v. Miller, 100 Eng. Rep. 1042, 1047 (1791).
211. Although no U.C.C. case mentions discharge as a disincentive, the idea is still around. See
4 W. HAWKLAND & L. LAWRENCE, supra note 30, § 3-407:07, at 624.
212. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 17, at 605 n.57.
213. For example, in North Carolina a fraudulent and material alteration of a negotiable instrument may fall within the scope of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-100 (1985), a criminal statute dealing with
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penalty to deter alteration.
The reason that the U.C.C. provides a penalty for alteration may
possibly be explained by the fact that the English common law rule on
alteration, which first provided for discharge, developed when the criminal law had not yet separated clearly from the civil law. Rules that are
today considered civil in nature often carried punishment or penalties as
if they were criminal in nature. 21 4 The penalty of discharge apparently
remained with the rule on alteration after the criminal law had clearly
broken away from the civil law, and is today a vestige of the early common law's lack of clear distinctions between civil and criminal law. If
the criminal law will do today what the rule on alteration's discharge was
originally intended to do, the penalty of discharge need no longer remain
215
in U.C.C. section 3-407(2)(a).
Another possible argument against abolishing the discharge provision is that subsequent holders might not be so careful about taking an
instrument with a material alteration if they need no longer fear discharge. Surely, however, that would not be the case. Under the present
section 3-407(2)(a) rule, even a holder in due course is punished for taking a materially altered instrument, in the sense that he can assert it
against the maker or drawer only for the original tenor and not as to any
greater amount. 21 6 If discharge is abolished as a result of alteration, the
outcome will be the same. Any party taking an instrument, whether a
holder in due course or not, must be concerned about a prior alteration,
because he will be able to enforce it against the maker or drawer only for
the original tenor, thus losing the difference between the original tenor
and the altered amount.
Finally, if discharge were eliminated as an effect of alteration, it appears that the result of alteration cases would not change, at least judging
by the outcome of the reported decisions. As noted earlier, no case under
the U.C.C. has resulted in a discharge under section 3-407, because the
alteration is found not to have been material, fraudulent, or made by a
holder. 2 17 In other words, most courts do not allow alteration to result
obtaining property by false pretenses, as well as N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-119 (1985), a criminal statute

concerning forgery of bank notes, checks, and other securities.

Before abolishing the discharge

provision of § 3-407, each state should examine its criminal statutes to be certain that the criminal
laws indeed provide adequate deterrence against alteration.
214. Although Glanville introduced his treatise with the remark that "some pleas are criminal
and some are civil," that statement bore little relation to the state of law in his time. Indeed, the line
between civil law and criminal law in medieval England was anything but certain. See T.
PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 421 (5th ed. 1956).
215. Cf U.C.C. §§ 7-208, 7-306 (1977), under which even a fraudulent and material alteration of
a document of title does not discharge the issuer's duty to deliver the goods according to the original
terms of the document.
216. This result, of course, assumes no negligence under U.C.C. § 3-406, and that a maker or
drawer who issues an instrument gives no warranty against material alterations under U.C.C. §§ 3417(2) and 4-207(2).
217. See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
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in discharge. Indeed, a court will probably not grant a discharge unless
it is quite clear that a holder indeed made a material alteration and did so
with fraudulent intent. As discussed earlier, only one case has even ap21 8
proached that model.
Although abolishing the windfall discharge does seem drastic, it
would actually complete the alteration rule's evolution, which began
when the holder in due course concept was introduced in the N.I.L., or
perhaps even earlier when the spoilation doctrine became part of the
American common law rule. Both of those innovations moved the rule
away from the theory and policy which had originally supported it.
Since that time, the gap between the rule and its original theory and
policy has continued to widen. With the introduction of the F.T.C. language and with the possible abolition of holder in due course status as to
a consumer check under the proposed U.N.P.C., however, the evolution
of the rule has regressed for the first time since the U.C.C. was proposed
in 1952. If the discharge provision of section 3-407(2)(a) is now abolished, the rule on alteration will return to the evolutionary path it has
generally followed over the past several hundred years, toward a more
liberalized rule allowing holders to enforce materially and fraudulently
altered instruments according to their original tenor.

218. First Pa. Bank & Trust Co. v. Kritzenberger, 13 Bucks Co. L.R. 321, 32 Pa. D. & C.2d 610
(1963).

HeinOnline -- 26 Washburn L.J. 70 1986-1987

